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THE GENEALOGY OF MODERNITY: FROM THE DECONSTRUCTION OF ROOTS TO THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICES IN NIETZSCHE'S PHILOSOPHY

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Abstract. Modernity has been characterized by its theoretical nature, constantly seeking to present explanatory theories about existence, science, and ethics. It embodied the spirit of rationality, which led Nietzsche to critique many understandings, such as those of Kant and Hegel, considering them to have sanctified idealism and killed realism- an attitude he believed prevailed during the modern era. Consequently, Nietzsche sought to deconstruct the foundational principles of rationality and criticize the practices adopted by modern man through rational philosophy. He did so by questioning all the concepts and foundations upon which modern philosophy was built. This research aims to uncover these critical insights. Modernity is distinguished by its theoretical and methodological character in interpreting ethics, examining the state of science, and producing explanatory theories in various branches of philosophy. Nietzsche, as we will explore, takes a critical stance toward these frameworks, aiming to dismantle them as disconnected from the actual condition of humanity. He argues that they excessively invoke metaphysical and rational considerations, thereby negating the value of the autonomous individual in favor of abstract constructs that, according to Nietzsche, extinguish the spirit of life.

Keywords: Nietzsche, modernity, ethics, history, science, religion

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ГЕНЕАЛОГИЯ СОВРЕМЕННОСТИ: ОТ ДЕКОНСТРУКЦИИ КОРНЕЙ К КРИТИКЕ ОПЫТА В ФИЛОСОФИИ НИЦШЕ

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Абстракт. Современность характеризуется своим теоретическим характером и постоянной тенденцией к представлению объяснительных теорий бытия, науки и морали. Она воплощала дух рационализма, который привел Ницше к критике многих концепций, таких как подходы Канта и Гегеля. Ницше считал, что они убивают реальность, освящением идеализма – по его мнению, эта позиция была господствующей в Новое время. Поэтому Ницше пытался деконструировать основные принципы рационализма и критиковать опыт современного человека посредством рациональной философии. Он сделал это, подвергнув сомнению все концепции и основания, на которых строилась современная философия. Цель данного исследования – раскрыть эти критические взгляды. Современность отличается своим теоретико-методологическим характером в интерпретации морали, анализе состояния науки и создании объяснительных теорий в различных областях философии. Ницше, как мы видели, занимает критическую позицию по отношению к этим концепциям, стремясь разрушить их, как будто они оторваны от реального состояния человечества. Он утверждает, что эти подходы опираются на чрезмерные метафизические и рациональные соображения, тем самым отрицая ценность независимой личности в пользу абстрактных конструкций. По мнению Ницше, эти конструкции подавляют дух жизни.

Ключевые слова: Ницше, Современность, мораль, история, наука, религия

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MÜASİRLİYİN GENEALOGİYASI: KÖKLƏRİN DEKONSTRUKSIYASINDAN - NİTSSƏNİN FƏLSƏFƏSİNDƏ TƏCRÜBƏLƏRİN TƏNQİDİNƏ DAİR

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Abdunnur Keçai**

Abstrakt. Müasirlik nəzəri xarakteri ilə səciyyələnir və mövcudluq, elm və əxlaq barədə izahlı nəzəriyyələr təqdim etməyə daim meyl göstərir. O, rəasionalizmin ruhunu təcəssüm etdirirdi ki, bu da Nitsşeni Kant və Hegelin yanaşmaları kimi bir çox anlayışları tənqid etməyə sövq etmişdir. Nitsşe onların idealizmi müqəddəsləşdirərək reallığı öldürdüyünü hesab edirdi – onun fikrincə, bu, müasir dövrdə üstünlük təşkil edən mövqe idi. Nəticə etibarilə, Nitsşe rəasionalizmin təməl prinsiplərini dekonstruksiya etməyə və rəasional fəlsəfə vasitəsilə müasir insanın qəbul etdiyi təcrübələri tənqid etməyə çalışdı. O, bunu müasir fəlsəfənin qurulduğu bütün anlayışları və əsasları sual altına almaqla etdi. Bu tədqiqat həmin tənqidi baxışları üzə çıxarmağı hədəfləyir. Müasirliyi əxlaqın şərhı, elmin vəziyyətinin təhlili və fəlsəfənin müxtəlif sahələrində izahedici nəzəriyyələrin yaradılmasında nəzəri-metodoloji xarakter fərqləndirir. Nitsşe, gördüyümüz kimi, bu çərçivələrə tənqidi mövqe tutur, onları insanlığın real durumundan qopmuş kimi sökmək məqsədini güdür. O, iddia edir ki, bu yanaşmalar həddindən artıq metafizik və rəasional mülahizələrə istinad edir və bununla da müstəqil fərdin dəyərini abstrakt konstruksiyaların xeyrinə inkar edir. Nitsşeyə görə, bu konstruksiyalar həyat ruhunu söndürür.

Açar sözlər: Nitsşe, müasirlik, əxlaq, tarix, elm, din

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1.Introduction

We will examine in this study Nietzsche's deconstruction of the systems of religion, science, and ethics, with a particular focus on the doctrines of Kant and Hegel, as they represent the most prominent pillars and entrenchments of modernity that have deeply influenced the condition of modern man.

This study aims to analyze Friedrich Nietzsche's critical philosophical stance on religion, science, and moral values by exploring the genealogical roots he employs to dismantle the moral and religious foundations of Western modernity. It seeks to demonstrate how Nietzsche connects his critique of Christianity and Judaism with his critique of science, viewing the latter as a continuation of metaphysics, in the broader context of deconstructing the modern image of the moral human being. The study also aims to reveal the continuity of religious values within secular thought and calls for a profound reassessment of the foundations upon which modern concepts such as "good," "compassion," and "truth" are based.

The central problem addressed in this study is the following question: To what extent does Nietzsche's critique of religion, science, and moral values constitute a radical deconstruction of the metaphysical foundations that continue to shape modern thought, despite its claim of emancipation from theology? This main question gives rise to several subsidiary questions, such as: Did Nietzsche truly succeed in overcoming metaphysics and religion through his genealogical project? Was he able to offer a philosophical alternative to prevailing values? And what are the limits of this critique in terms of its impact on our understanding of science, humanity, and ethics in the modern era?

Based on this critical analysis of Nietzsche's thought, the research is built upon two main hypotheses. First, it is assumed that Nietzsche does not merely critique traditional religion in its Christian and Jewish forms, but goes further to reveal the persistence of religious values at the core of the modern project itself. This suggests that modernity did not truly break away from religion, but rather reproduced it through new frameworks tied to science and collective morality, using concepts such as the "common good" and "compassion," which Nietzsche sees as hidden extensions of Christian ethics. Second, it is assumed that Nietzsche's genealogical method, despite its deconstructive and critical nature, is not limited to demolition. Rather, it opens the door to constructing an alternative morality rooted in the will to power and the affirmation of life—thus surpassing the notions of sacrifice and submission that have marked Western ethics. This, in turn, calls for a radical philosophical reevaluation of the concept of the "moral human" as presented by modernity.

2.Religion and Science in Nietzsche's Perspective

2.1.Against Religion in Its Descriptions and Practices

Nietzsche rarely refers to the broad diversity of religious expressions; instead, he focuses his fierce criticism on Christianity and Judaism, while deliberately avoiding criticism of Islam, which he regards as an exceptional phenomenon. This is because, in Nietzsche's view, the principles of strength and life are present in Islam- even at a relatively late historical stage. He even praised the Islamic experience in Spain, considering it a model expression of life.

He wrote: "*Christianity deprived us of the fruits of ancient culture, and later also of the fruits of Islamic culture. The civilization of Arab Spain—so close to us, speaking more to our senses and tastes than Rome or Greece—was trampled underfoot (and I would rather not look at whose feet!)—Why? Because that civilization drew its light from aristocratic instincts, virile instincts, and because it affirmed life, alongside the delicate refinements of Arab life... The Crusaders fought against a world before which they should have bowed down in the dust- a world of civilization that, when compared to our own 19th century, might make the latter appear poor and backward! They were dreaming of spoils, no doubt- the East was rich!*" [Hammiche, 2016]. This position consistently underlies Nietzsche's total rejection of Christianity. However, what must be understood from Nietzsche's critique of religion as a spiritual framework for societies is that it targets its moral foundation and its divine anchoring.

Nietzsche, in fact, rejects religion in terms of its principles and generalities, which are relatively shared among various religions and beliefs from ancient times to modernity. Thus, it can be said that he never truly endorses religion in any absolute sense. His earlier praise of Islam may merely reflect his intense desire for power, war, spoils, and other primal human drives for which he seeks philosophical justification. However, viewing Islam through such a narrow and reductive lens does not constitute wisdom, especially considering that, theologically, Islam may share moral aspects with Christianity and Judaism, while surpassing both in its conception of faith in a transcendent, exalted, and sanctified Creator.

When examining the origins of religion, we encounter two main theories: The **evolutionary theory**, which holds that the idea of God emerged in early societies as beliefs developed either from individuals or from collective experience; And the **innate theory**, which posits that the idea of God- or religion in general- is an inherent concept, naturally embedded in the human mind by a higher being. [Al-Nashar, 2009, p.28]

The first idea is a conceptual one, invented by humans and agreed upon by a community sharing a common way of life. The second represents divine immanence within the human mind as something innate. If we adopt Eriugena's conception of God, it can be summarized in the statement that "the

world comes from God, and God is the 'being that encompasses all things,' the 'all in all,'" which is a formulation of pantheism [Tatarkiewicz, 2012, p.103]. Most religions and belief systems share the notion of a transcendent Creator God, even those ancient doctrines that portrayed deities in various forms- as fate, or as sources of beauty, morality, strength, and other aspects that linked humanity to the metaphysical realm.

Nietzsche's critique of religion thus arises from its practical dimension- as a system of values and morals that obligates humans not to transcend their limits in worship and submission to the Creator. Religion, in this sense, imposes its moral concepts and asserts control over human thought. As Nietzsche describes: *"And who, indeed, has succeeded in finding a way out- if not us? The modern man? (I do not know an entrance from an exit; I am all those who do not know an entrance from an exit), says the modern man with a sigh... We were sick from this modernity- sick from this rotten peace, from cowardly compromises, from the total virtuous filth of modern 'Yes' and 'No'; that tolerance and open-mindedness that 'forgives' everything because it 'understands' everything- is nothing but a poisonous wind to us"* [Nietzsche, A. (2011), p.25].

Nietzsche constantly casts doubt on the virtues upheld by Christianity, which, as he later reveals, conceal a Jewish undertone.

What concerns us in Nietzsche's critique of moral practices is the subtle infiltration of the spirit of these religions into modern philosophical thought. Modernists, he argues, have consistently oriented their perspectives under the sway of submission to religious values- adopting their concepts, applications, and even manifestations. As he writes: *"The noble values that man must live to serve- especially when they lay their heavy hands upon him: these social values, which, to reinforce their power, have been elevated above humanity as though they were divine commandments, as though they were 'truths,' as though they represented the 'real world'"* [Nietzsche, B. (2011), p.25]. What Nietzsche calls for, then, is a constant questioning of the religious desire to possess humanity- those whom religion summons to its cause, yet who in reality embody its greatest contradiction.

The concept of God in Judaism, according to Nietzsche, was falsified to serve their historical narrative. The Jews, he argues, were among the most fervent in their desire for life and survival, yet they violated their moral covenant with the deity "Yahweh." The notion of justice among them, Nietzsche suggests, became a tool for pursuing worldly desires cloaked in a false theological framework invented by Jewish priests to serve their own interests. They reshaped the idea of God into that of a policing authority, linking all forms of happiness to divine reward and all suffering to punishment from the same divine source. Nietzsche writes: *"And once the natural causal connection was*

abolished by the concepts of reward and punishment, there arose the need for an unnatural causality. From this point forward, all that is unnatural would follow" [p.61]. This contradiction between motivations and outcomes, Nietzsche argues, passed from Judaism into Christianity, carried through the moral falsification orchestrated by the Jewish priesthood.

Nietzsche sees that the depravity of the Jews seeped into Christianity under the pretext of stripping man of his values and reducing them to mere rewards and punishments. "It appeared to them that they could dispense with all the history of Israel- so that it would vanish, then! Those priests accomplished a miraculous act of falsification in such a way that they turned an important part of the Gospel into a document about it: with unparalleled contempt for every tradition and every historical reality through which they reinterpreted the past of their people in a religious manner. In other words, they transformed it into a ridiculous mechanism of salvation, founded on guilt toward Yahweh and the punishment that follows, and piety toward Yahweh along with the sins that result" [Nietzsche, 2011, pp.61-62]. These outcomes have necessarily been molded into the inherent contradiction of Christianity, as he will point out.

Nietzsche's rejection of Christianity describes it as a contradiction between motives and principles, considering the source of Christian values to be self-deception. For example, pity is defined as sympathy with others and sharing their feelings, but its true purpose is the fear that what happens to the one pitied might happen to the one who feels pity: "*You crowd around your neighbors and overwhelm them with sweet words, but I say to you: your love for your neighbors is harmful to yourselves. You flee from yourselves to your neighbors and wish to make this a virtue, but I perceive the hidden truth behind it- that it is a denial of your own self*" [Ibrahim, 2007, pp.209-210]. Thus, pity is a base idea, as he describes it, merely changing its appearance.

In this Nietzschean tracing of Christianity, he reveals the contradiction between the motives of Christian morality and its principles, concluding from his overall analysis that all Christian virtues have fundamental weaknesses for humanity. Rather than serving humans, they make them subject to ridicule and obscure their ability to achieve their full human vitality. The praise of moral virtues among Christians is actually a form of love aimed at highlighting their own selves, as an obsession with fulfilling their own desires before those of the other person, who is positioned as weak and deceitful, and is thus not free. Meanwhile, those who cling to Christianity as leadership (the priests) have fulfilled all their desires based on hatred, revenge, and deception of other selves. Here, their goals and schemes succeed, especially considering the foolishness of those who believe in these contradictory morals.

From this, we understand that Nietzsche rejects religion in its totalizing concepts (the idea of God, creation, etc.), as well as deconstructing the self-

imposed values and morals, calling for their overthrow. He considers that these have infiltrated modern man one way or another, preserved through their conceptual and value-based requisites. What we will witness in his critique of modern philosophy is much doubt cast on this transition from Judaism and Christianity to modern ideas, even in the age of science and secularism.

2.2.Critique of the Dichotomy Between the Scientific Method and Science

Nietzsche establishes a distinction between science and the scientific method, considering that the conflict was originally about scientific knowledge itself, which was subjective and not based on convictions or evidence-in ancient times, it consisted merely of conflicting claims all attempting to steal and seize the truth. With the advancement of the scientific method in modernity, the critical aspect turned to the meanings and results described by the scientific method. "The systematic search for truth is, moreover, the outcome of those eras in which convictions clashed. If the individual did not flatter himself with his ('truth'), that is, by always being right, there would be no methodology for inquiry. But thus, within this eternal struggle of various individuals' claims to possess absolute truth, people advance step by step to discover irrefutable principles by which the validity of these claims can be tested and their conflicts eased" [Nietzsche, 2002, p.243]. Nietzsche presents his critical stance toward positivist scientific knowledge from mathematics, chemistry, biology, and experimental history.

What Nietzsche sees as correct is the triumph of the scientific method over science itself, since science derives its value from accumulated achievements, with the method serving as the regulator and organizer of the state of science as a value. As he states, "Scientific methodologies are the result of the search for importance, at least as much as for any other result, because the scientific mindset relies on the intelligence of methodology, and without these methodologies, all scientific results would be unable to prevent the return of superstition and nonsense to dominance once again" [Nietzsche, 2002, p.243]. Thus, according to Nietzsche, sciences have reached what they are thanks to the methods that controlled and organized their previous chaos.

However, even with this progress that Nietzsche assumes, he does not hesitate to once again doubt the results and methods of science, since modern positivist science has not left the realm of contradiction regarding the centrality of humans in the universe, to the extent that science has come to signify the negation of the human condition.

The results of science, like its goals, function to provide the greatest possible amount of happiness. Yet, conversely, they bring suffering and distress to the person seeking the pleasure of science. "But how can science achieve that if pleasure and distress form a single knot, to the extent that whoever wants to obtain the greatest possible pleasure must suffer at least the same amount of

distress?" [Nietzsche, undated, p.42]. Therefore, according to Nietzsche, anyone capable of investigating the purposes of science must be prepared to endure sorrow, even unto death.

In this way, Nietzsche's perspective is characterized by its dominance in the search for values of life and liberation, rather than broad contemplation that elevates reason above life. His overall characterization of the state of modern science is its confrontation with doubt- the same stance he took toward religion and metaphysics. Science, despite its interpretations aimed against metaphysics, ultimately subordinated itself to metaphysics; metaphysics continued to morally enslave science. "If we believe that science [according to Nietzsche] still is and will remain based on a metaphysical belief" [Mifrej, 2009, p.67]. Thus, metaphysics remained a controlling source over science, and science made no progress in negating it despite advances in mechanical explanations with Newton.

Science, with these goals, has remained captive to religion and ethics rather than being their opposite. It did not triumph over the ascetic ideal that opposed humanity and life in classical stages. The reason is that both the ascetic ideal and science share a common nature in their refusal to doubt absolute truths. "Both science and the ascetic ideal remain on the same ground, as I have already indicated: they converge in their shared exaggeration of the value of truth" [Nietzsche, 1981, p.148]. Thus, the nature of science and the ascetic ideal equally agree on the refusal to question the value of truth.

What can be concluded, collectively and comprehensively, from Nietzsche's critique of the modern scientific movement is the agreement of science with the metaphysical triad [reason, religion, ethics]. This is the battle Nietzsche waged against anything that could justify this triad, on all its levels [science, scientific method, scientists]. However, he sees the necessity to dismantle this problematic connection and to redirect science toward serving human nature without ethical paradoxes, metaphysical contradictions, or guidance resembling divine inspiration. What Nietzsche will later develop serves as the foundation for his critique of modernists in their scientific, ethical, and spiritual form, including their interpretations which seemed realistic but which Nietzsche eventually rejected, fully dismissing the metaphysical dualistic framework of the world.

3.On the Question of Critical Values

3.1.The Problematic of the Origin of Moral Values

The problem of the origin of philosophy occupies a large part of Nietzsche's concerns. His inquiry is based on the principle of genealogy, which serves as a critique of critique itself. The critical movement, in its classical sense-meaning "pure critique" or "metaphysical critique"- shifts toward the inseparability of meaning and value in philosophy. Thus, we can also say that

genealogy is the extraction and critique of abstract concepts, focusing particularly on the problematics of the origin of values and their critique. In this sense, it seeks the following principles- according to Gilles Deleuze- "The philosophy of values, as he establishes and conceives it, is the real accomplishment of critique, the only way to achieve total critique, that is, to forge philosophy with hammer blows."

The critical problem Nietzsche assumes is the re-evaluation and reordering of values in themselves and from their foundations, taking genealogy as a conceptual path in his work.

Nietzsche notices that Kantian criticism did not fully complete its structure, or more precisely, it did not conduct a genuine critique of values. At the time, Kant did not grasp Nietzsche's problematics with the precision of value inquiry; he avoided questioning values through their concepts and expressions. Meanwhile, modernity, in terms of ethics, was based on conformity and did not select its subject for a fundamentally different ontological foundation. Thus, it is subject to what it found itself on- a pattern that seems at first glance to be new- the Kantian ethics. However, the deeper issue that must be posed is: "the value of values, the evaluation from which their worth arises, thus the problem of their creation. Evaluation is defined as the differential element specific to the corresponding values: it is both a critical and creative element." Nietzsche's perspective is therefore the opposite of Kantian criticism, which he regards as a mere theoretical work that does not align with the inquiry into values [Deleuze, 2011, p.5].

The critical movement in Nietzsche's thought is approached in two interconnected ways: "the attribution of everything, and every origin, some value to values; but also the attribution of these values to something that is their origin and determines their value" [Deleuze, 2011, p.6]. The evaluation of morality essentially stems from a fascination that clarified concepts specific to describing humans, such as "good-evil," "right-wrong," and others- values that modernity adopted to judge the noble human from the base one. However, this fascination fundamentally traces back to the moral theorists' gratitude toward the realization of the superior self, which upholds pride as its standard, employing new concepts to express their moral foundation. "What philosophers called the 'foundation of morality' and proposed for themselves was, if seen clearly in broad daylight, merely a polished form of good faith in prevailing morals and a new means of expressing them; it was therefore a certain moral fact, and at its core, a kind of refusal to consider these morals as a problem" [Nietzsche, 2003, p.128].

From this perspective, Nietzsche raises a total and comprehensive skepticism toward the founders and critics of the fate of values, seeing them as lacking the

necessary status for true application, or as mere manipulation of meanings that preserves the pattern of value practices.

As for Nietzsche's genealogical approach, it revisits the problem of the origin of values, since Nietzsche does not trust the absolute nature of moral judgment, whether rational or utilitarian. This is because value interpretation affirms the necessity of existence and control in practice, not hypothetically. There is no room to impose a general law that carries within it pre-existing concepts and perceptions that judge a moral act as valuable or not. Thus, "morality must *be*, not *become*: it takes the results of our actions by the reins and does not care at all whether we have 'improved' in the meantime" [Nietzsche, 2003, p.124]. According to Nietzsche, the theoretical aspect of morality did not go beyond the previous representations of European society, and morality must take power as the real criterion for value evaluation.

3.2. Genealogy of the Modern Moral Human

Nietzsche critiques the moral traits of the modern era on the basis that it remains committed to the state of humanity during Christianity, despite modern thought adopting a scientific and secular perspective. The underlying structure in its morality, however, covertly returns to Christianity- not the one claimed theoretically- but the Christianity manifested inwardly. That is, the advances in ethical foundations claim to be newly founded, while they continue to draw their origins from Christianity, relying on conceptual as well as value-based classification.

The modern moral human finds themselves depending on traditional values whose conceptual origin stems from Christian practice, such as the sayings "the good for all," "disinterestedness," and others. These inherently carry the Christian meaning based on the principles of "compassion" and "sympathy." Thus, from this standpoint, the modern human remains subject to the visible Christian influence in the discursive traits of private and public ethics.

The outcome of modern ethics culminates in two models: the first pretends to claim the absolute, meaning the liberation and sanctification of the individual- this is the secular construction of ethical individuality. The second urges the call for rapprochement with the other, thus forming the transition to the alterity of ethics. Whether ethics is individualistic or altruistic, relying on sacrifice and compassion, it is, in other words, a religious dimension that has only managed to free itself by believing in the duality of the world; beyond that, classical ethical beliefs have largely remained intact.

Nietzsche views the genealogy of the modern human as seeing moral ideals since the texts of tolerance by Voltaire and up to Schopenhauer, who called for goodwill, as having abolished the transcendent spirit by dissolving the individual into ethical participation with others within the framework of what is a state or a nation, or even what is described as a harmonious and inseparable

ethical reciprocity between the individual and the community. This starts from the relationship of empathy between individual and individual within a system that seeks a general social benefit based on the utmost sacrifice for the other, which hardly separates from what was Christian, fluctuating between "love and compassion." This is shown through a historical reading of the French Revolution, which was founded on sacrifice for the other and the socialism of governance, property, and rights- whether a society, a state, a nation, a union of nations, or new economic communities- in contrast to denouncing individual existence as an extreme evil. This is the fundamental moral current in the modern era, where there is a blending of the principle of 'empathy' and the principle of 'social sensibility'" [Al-Sheikh, 2008, p.442].

Despite the symmetrical and latent multiplicity of sources of modern moral evaluation, Nietzsche rejects all prevailing moral principles as a tension between ancient and classical thinking, transmitting humanity to modernity.

Despite the near-complete abandonment by modern ethics of the idea of the afterlife or God as the sacred, it has not definitively renounced faith. In other words, it established another foundation- the moral conscience- as the guarantor of moral action. In logical terms, it can be said that modern ethics have abandoned the bearer but retained the carried; that is, humans have exploited certain benefits outside the religious thesis, especially in matters of money, freedom, and science.

Even if humans have humanized themselves by elevating the status of benefits, they have not abandoned the old moral meanings (Greek) and classical (Christian) ones. This is the nature of modernity, which relies on reason or the purified feeling. "But the hierarchy of benefits cannot remain rigid and fixed across all ages. A person who prefers revenge over justice is a moral person according to the standards of a past civilization, and immoral according to the standards of our current civilization. The word 'immoral' means that the individual has not yet felt, or has only slightly felt, the noble motives in the scale of gentleness and reason, which each time is considered the outcome of a new civilization" [Nietzsche, 2002, p.44]. Those ancient civilizations that were overcome by Greek rationality or Christian religion, which established the ethics of reason and feeling for the other, and which modernity adopted on similar foundations but abandoned only God or the dualistic world, have not led modern humans to new aspirations since they still consider reason as the essence inspiring their civilization.

In this way, Nietzsche calls for a threefold rupture with Greek rationality, Christian religion, and modern ethical theorists who carry the burdens of their predecessors, by rejecting their theoretical constructs and their conscientious practices that founded the modern human, post-religion or post-French

Revolution, who humanized himself on the values of rights, alterity, participation, sacrifice, and reciprocity.

3.3.Addressing the issue of Kantian moral conscience

“Kant” is regarded as one of the most prominent ethical doctrines throughout the history of the theoretical philosophical foundation of moral action. His approach involves purifying humans from passions and baseness, elevating the value of transcendental principles based on the principle of equality inherently due to every human being. Up to this point, Kant is considered the founder of the critical moral doctrine, described as critical ethics, which Nietzsche rejects, regarding it as- Kant’s philosophy- the culmination of European thought in the domain of ethics. Kant’s inquiry into morality returns to the Greek division that categorized types of knowledge into nature, ethics, and logic. Kant views logic as most likely concerned with empirical material results since formal rationality reaches conclusions that have been established in nature itself. If we consider the metaphysics of nature, then similarly we can speak of metaphysical ethics that employ reason as their faithful essence, apart from its empirical shortcomings- that is, separating what utilitarian, empirical, and natural rationalist philosophers do from pure reason as the regulator and creator of moral practice [Kant, 1965, p.6].

Kantian accountability for the value of ethics depends on the motive behind performing the moral act. For Kant, Machiavellian utilitarianism, which leads everyone toward the fate of a single individual, is merely frustrating whims and absurdities, not true ethics. He argues that ethics must be evaluated appreciatively, stating, “They did not realize that emotion is changeable and relative and cannot serve as a measure of good and evil” [Karam, n.d., p.247]. Kant’s critique encompassed utilitarian, empirical, and even rationalist doctrines due to their excessive theoretical overlap on the one hand and their emphasis on the motives behind actions rather than what the moral conscience ought to be on the other.

In light of the contribution of “Kantian moral conscience,” there is a discussion about embracing idealism and advocating it as the purification of behavior from pleasure, utility, and happiness- as the goal a human voluntarily seeks to achieve. Kant evaluates the motive as residing in the will itself and returns moral conscience to the general principle known as duty [Al-Taweel, 1979, p.221]. His philosophy later transforms into the philosophy of duty, as readers have referred to Kant’s philosophy. Based on his idea of duty, whose motto is “duty for duty’s sake,” duty acts as a moral law that opposes the will’s self-serving impulses. Kant states, “We must be able to will that the maxim of our actions should become a universal law. This is the criterion of the moral judgment of our actions in general. It is in the nature of some actions that their maxim cannot, without contradiction, be conceived as a universal law, and it

is a serious mistake to think that the will can impose this upon itself. Truly, this internal impossibility does not exist" [Kant, 1965, p.65]. Kant's critical question carried the implication: Can self-love be an absolute natural law? No, this is rejected on the grounds that it destroys life through the excessive belief that the will is purely self-regarding.

In general, Kant's philosophy of duty carried noble meanings, centered on the moral conscience that transcends yielding to worldly motives, elevating it to the status of acting according to what is a moral duty rather than a motive for any other end, no matter the outcome. Even if it requires coming together to commit an unjust act to preserve other virtues, this is rejected by Kant because it lowers the act to a mere motive on one hand and diminishes another human being on the other. Such an act is not among the natures on which humans have established themselves.

Regarding Kant as a moral model criticized by Nietzsche, this stems from Kant's position in Nietzsche's philosophy. It is noted that Nietzsche holds two appreciations of Kant: first, Nietzsche greatly esteems Kant in philosophy for his exceptional critical role and influence on subsequent thinkers, since Kant awakened reason to seek knowledge and challenges, including metaphysical ones. Nietzsche sees Kantian rational transcendence- the search for knowledge, truth, values, and theorizing these elements- as an extraordinary and distinctive challenge to European civilizational reality. The second observation is Nietzsche's rejection of Kantian philosophy's principles based on absolute rationality in its comprehensive epistemological foundations, leading Nietzsche to criticize Kant's conscientious moral philosophy. Therefore, Nietzsche's dual interest in Kant invites serious reflection on this philosophical engagement.

Moral conscience in Nietzsche's philosophy takes on a broader, more approximate meaning than it did for Kant. Whereas Kant bound it to duty, Nietzsche fundamentally questions the belief in moral conscience in terms of the imposed values that submit themselves to absolute and definitive judgment, beyond any doubt. He considers them, like their predecessors- classical and modern ethics before Kant- to be transient and obsolete. In his book *The Gay Science* (or *The Joyful Science*), Nietzsche says:

"And here you are, those who admire the absolute command within you, and the supposed firmness of your moral judgment? And the 'absoluteness of the feeling that others ought to judge as I do'? It is truly selfishness to feel one's own judgment as a universal law, and such selfishness is blind and vile... because it reveals that you have not yet found yourself; that you have not created for yourself a purely personal example... Whoever still judges that 'in such a case, everyone must do such and such' is a person who has made no progress in knowing himself, even a little, otherwise he would know that there

are never, and cannot be, identical actions- every action has been done in a unique way and cannot be repeated, and the same applies to every future action.” [Nietzsche, 1989, p.357] Where Kant sees uniformity in ethics or calls for its idealism, Nietzsche rejects this on the grounds that human diversity cannot be subjected to this absolute ethical model. Behind this call for ideal ethics lies a covert despotic zeal, as it imposes rites of hierarchy- an equalizing of everyone within a single system that ends up subordinated to duty, making society like a herd or a military system. This is the true aim of Kant according to Nietzsche’s critical understanding of the goal of moral conscience in Kant’s thought. Nietzsche also points to the base features implanted by Kant- such as duty and the sacred- arguing that the history of humanity since its beginning has been dominated by the tones of wars, differentiation, conflict, and intensification [Nietzsche, p.41].

Nietzsche continues his critique of Kant, elaborating on the shift of actions into the realm of values, whereas previously the moral action was measured by its ability to achieve successful rather than poor results. “During the longest phase of human history, namely the prehistoric period, the value- or lack thereof- of an action came from the results of that action... and that was the virtue, the virtue of success or failure, by which people judged the quality or worthlessness of an action... But suddenly, the dawn of a new and deadly superstition appeared, the dominance of a narrow interpretation that rose on the horizon: that the origin of an action should be attributed to the intention from which it sprang, and it was agreed that the value of the action lies in the value of the intention. Thus, intention came to include the cause of the action and its prehistory.” [Mufrej, 2009, pp.37-38]. For Nietzsche, Kant advocates a morality of decadence, seeking a reasonable freedom to liberate virtues from impulses. However, this possibility cannot triumph as the rightful call for a higher human morality, because what actually dominates are the overlapping impulses of the powerful. The moral evaluation standards imposed by Kant as concepts are nothing but superstition, a maze, and a downfall, described as a turn toward love of humanity and the distribution of principles of mercy and compassion within it.

It is noteworthy that Nietzsche’s critique of Kant extends beyond the subject of ethics to that of aesthetics. Kant imposes the principle that "the beautiful is always moral," but to Nietzsche, Kant is feeble and incapable of aesthetic judgment as a philosopher who obligates all artistic manifestations to a moralistic vagueness. Nietzsche’s belief is that each ethics has its own perspective that it realizes. He says in this regard: “Kant’s knowledge of people is limited, and he is weak as a psychologist. He makes serious errors regarding great historical values (such as the French Revolution) and is an ethical zealot in the manner of Rousseau. Deep within him runs a current of Christian values,

from the crown of his head to the soles of his feet, which he grudgingly endures to the point that he would like to persecute it, but he quickly tires even of skepticism, since he is unaffected by universal taste or ancient beauty... thus, he has become a retardant to movement and a mediator." [Nietzsche, 2011, 41]. For Nietzsche, it is not important to transition from monk to legislator, or to achieve the morally and rationally transcendent human. Rather, it is the dominance of the will to power over all domains of life, whether ethical or aesthetic. In short, Nietzsche rejects Kantian ethical critique as a justification for reviving or correcting some of ethics according to the faculty of reason. Differential ethics, for Nietzsche, is the investigation of the natural gradations of power, not the fixed imprint as Kantian ethics exists. This represents Nietzsche's call for a complete ethical transcendence of modernity- whether as concepts, interpretations, or even theoretical foundations.

Once we place Immanuel Kant between legitimacy and deconstruction, other instrumental angles can be drawn out. Just as Nietzsche always questioned the motive pursued by the moral theorists, we will question it in the same sense regarding the applications that his postmodern roots have brought forth, or the stages of his presence within what Herbert Marcuse describes as the philosophies of negation, namely Marx and Engels, and the socialist current in general.

Kant referred the modern human being to an ideal and perfect morality-transcendent- as if it were a new doctrinal system. Some scholars even consider him a new liberator of Christianity in an unprecedented humanistic manner. What can be understood is that reactionary movements in particular (Marx and Nietzsche) came to eliminate and erase this philosophy because they wanted, in one way or another, to provoke chaos and disregard for the divine spiritual law, as well as the sacred human law. Thus, social materialism was formed with Marx, followed by dominant individualistic humanism with Nietzsche.

It is worth noting here that Kant represents the last European attempt to restore modern humanity's metaphysical relation in forming ethics and human values. Therefore, we must philosophically inquire why Kant did not form a political ideology despite his brilliant status in philosophy and its connection to other fields of science. Philosophies of negation and chaos were embraced even though they lack theoretical and epistemological coherence and did not even find an epistemological character (theory of knowledge), making them appear patched up between pre-Socratic disputes and the corruption of modern man with a humanistic character that does not respect natural law- even!

Even what is described as postmodern or contemporary remains oscillating between Marx and Nietzsche, despite their lack of the philosophical priorities essentially represented by logic. More strangely, why is there this Western insistence on denying modern philosophies as ontological rather than

theoretical, by disregarding their metaphysical, political, and ethical subjects? And why the shift to a new kind of philosophy that mainly focuses on methodology? This inquiry, rooted in philosophy, might lead us to understand what is contemporary within the framework described as centrism in the clash of civilizations, the topic of globalization, as well as domination and the death of politics before matter.

As for the concept of humanity, Nietzsche did not fully embrace its foundational aspects integratively; rather, he reinterpreted it according to the framework each of his philosophies presented. Consequently, he did not escape the conceptual problem surrounding the topic of humanity, even for the first generation influenced by Nietzsche, such as the existentialists.

The contemporary critique of modern ethical philosophy has always and continues to direct its arrows against Kant's idealistic philosophy, where contemporary discourse draws forth the concept of "violence" at all levels, including linguistic violence. Therefore, Western discourse has come to establish what is "human"- in its own particular understanding of humanity- rather than what is ethical, so that the "concept of humanity" is no longer promoted positively as it was defined in Kant's thought. Thus, conceptual contexts must be carefully investigated and comprehensively regulated, not subjected to individual interpretations as preferred or understood by those contesting it- for example, Nietzsche's case- because the historical roots of the birth of any concept or phenomenon express the original idea, and what remains are only fragmented branches and illusory variations attempting to present an alternative image that masks the origin, source, and status of that idea.

4. Between the History of Philosophy and the Philosophy of History

For the reader of Nietzsche, his stance toward philosophies of history appears somewhat imprecise. Mostly, it is linked either to ethics or occasionally to the political aspect, especially regarding how some systems were influenced by modernist theorists. At the core of Nietzsche's reading, we notice a complete rejection of the philosophy of history as a culture of systems or as history itself, particularly concerning the origin of its roots and the ultimate formulation of the interpretive frameworks in history and the philosophy of history. What follows can be considered an attempt centered primarily on the critical aspect, where the foundation for reading history with Nietzsche takes a new methodological approach. Consequently, it is a dual process of destruction and reconstruction. We will focus on the destructive side, which is critical of the philosophy of history as a whole, including Hegelian philosophy as a stage of elevation, in order to present Nietzschean premises for reordering the priorities of historical inquiry in the upcoming chapters.

4.1.Critique of Modernist Culture on the Philosophy of History

One of the topics that modernity has extensively engaged with is the philosophy of history, especially in examining the divisions of historical stages- from primitive antiquity to conscious modernity. What can generally be drawn from theories interpreting the philosophy of history is that the philosopher of history establishes human self-awareness within the frameworks of history, where history forms an important aspect of human consciousness regarding progress. These philosophers adopt different concepts depending on their presentation, sometimes overlapping- such as universality, cosmopolitics, determinism, teleology, and other interpretations offered to understand the movement of history as a consciousness distinct from what classical (pre-modern) man believed.

What emerges from Nietzsche's stance is his rejection of concepts that advocate generalization in historical interpretation, such as universality, spirit, process, cosmism, and rationality. He also rejects methodological concepts like fact, historical event, causality, and teleology. Nietzsche opposes these concepts because they have dominated culture and were elevated in value at the expense of ontological beauty. Since modern historians have immersed themselves in interpreting history without considering what constitutes actual facts, their approach became merely a study of reality through the data of the past. "When there is an excessive indulgence in history, or its role is glorified excessively, life withers and fades" [Al-Sheikh, 2008, p.81]. This led Nietzsche to deconstruct this conceptual-cultural system because it departed from the ability to unravel the existential content of contemporary human problems. In other words, it became a disease threatening human destiny, relying on dead history to solve the puzzles of the living present.

And given what the modern historian carries of the reverberation of distortion in his study of the past of peoples, it becomes a contempt for life-meaning that history, by mere observation, does not seek that spirit which created the artistic work, but rather only new developments in narrative and discourse about ideas whose defining characteristic is antiquity. This is because the culture of historical concepts prevents him from seeing the new meaning and immersing in ancient arts and aesthetics. For history does not imitate boldness, enthusiasm, and strength but rather seeks to trivialize these aesthetics by shaping them into a historical framework and granting them the status of classicism or a bygone historical period.

Philosophical concepts of history have come to captivate historical knowledge with the historian's role, meaning that he practices consciousness against what has preceded history. As the historian advances- "no sooner does he conquer one day over the day he is in, than he becomes a diligent excavator, digging deeply to bring that past day out of oblivion. Nothing, even the trivial

or insignificant, can escape his mind; rather, he hastens to immortalize it as soon as it becomes the subject of his knowledge." This is what Sheikh [p.82] saw, where Nietzsche is understood to mean that the historian obliterates the true identity of the subject of the past in exchange for ensuring the admiration and glory of his cultural work.

What Nietzsche observed about modernists is that they continued to treat the past as "death" or that it was necessary to deal with it in its living form. This claim is an emotional and sentimental aspect: "They want, if possible, to revive the past from among the dead and breathe new life into it. And since their number was large, we faced the greatest portion of the dead" [Al-Sheikh, 2008, p.83]. However, Nietzsche attacks all the attempts that misguidedly tried to understand history from an intellectual (theoretical) perspective, as it is an era marked by an explosion in historical research- modernity- as if history had become a source of life. This criticism is aimed at the systematic historians who turned it into a culture specific to German schools- especially those that established the "tyranny of the historical sense," which he sees as hostile to the forms and strength of life.

The aspect that makes history a burden on humans in Nietzsche's view is that it debates the conditions of the past while neglecting the present and future. The study of history by modernists effectively abolishes foresight, which is a failure to consider what ought to be. Philosophers of history should have sought what will be. For this reason, we notice that the concept of the philosophy of history among contemporaries has shifted toward interpretations of civilizational concepts that discuss the future of states, nations, and civilizations according to their movement toward what matters to humans as existential beings, disregarding the dominance of historical processes, which have always been associated with rudeness and mistakes. According to Nietzsche, the irrational cannot dominate the ontological because humans do not cease creating artistic, cultural, and civilizational innovation.

Since the philosophies of history have aimed to depict an image of the ideal state, we take as models (Hegelian philosophy: the state of the capable as the realization of reason), (the Positivism of Auguste Comte: the establishment of the state and maintenance of order through scientific progress), and (Spencer's evolutionary theory: which seeks progress in the industrial organization of society according to Darwin's theory of evolution) [Andalusi, 2006, pp.106-107].

These philosophies bet on competitiveness as something that will bring good to humanity as a whole, based on accepting the mechanisms of the capitalist system as somewhat reliable and absolute values. In this way, they follow the same classical path which holds that reason necessarily constitutes existence. Despite their broad influence, these philosophies consider the capitalist system

a necessary stage for building a prosperous future. This claim is rejected by Nietzsche, as shown by his rejection of the political principles of modernity, such as democracy and socialism.

4.2. The Demolition of the Principles of the Philosophy of History

Nietzsche has always been one of the anti-systemic philosophers who called for the explosion of systems and, consequently, the rejection of methodological conditions. This vision led him to criticize the philosophy of history and its principles, which were established through methodologies and systematic writing. He rejects the primordial meanings of history—those that call for believing in the existence of a cosmological history or that history follows a course carrying rational significance as a result of divine care. In summary, it is "a rational cosmic history" with its causes, reasons, goals, and necessarily outcomes. Nietzsche finds it unnatural to describe a historical event as historical truth, as this meaning takes a negative direction. He does not believe in anything that claims universality or the movement of history from a collective perspective, considering them mere fantasies full of wonder that this process has invented.

What Nietzsche describes as the negative philosophy of history is that the historical course of the world is merely an illusory concept invented by moralists since its fundamental principle is the rationality of history. "There is no such thing as 'rationality in history'; this is human wonder and imagination. How could reason, which is part of the world and history, judge the world and history?" [Al-Sheikh, 2008, p.87]. In this way, Nietzsche rejects the principle of causality in history and, consequently, historical consciousness as it is founded on cosmic moral judgments that control its destiny. By rejecting both causality and teleology, Nietzsche dismantles the concept of necessity, redirecting it toward another path- chance and absurdity.

Nietzsche's critique of the concept of the universal, the whole, or the cosmic- what corresponds in Hegelian culture to the course of history, the flow of history, or the course of the world- aligns with his dismantling of these ideas by viewing them as a conceptual system of history. This system justifies some mistakes committed by certain peoples and nations, and if we may say, it is a form of historical theology that does not serve philosophy and its subjects but rather distorts them under the claim of spirituality. It serves as a clear model for the applications of the Hegelian dialectical method, which considers that the birth of civilization was in rational Greece (as a thesis), its opposite Christianity (as antithesis), and modernity as synthesis.

This impossibility of combining the whole or the universal with the world's course is also the impossibility of combining reason and history, as it rejects practical or comprehensive history- concepts commonly circulated by modern philosophers of history. Nietzsche regards these merely as contemptuous and

astonishing references, which the modernist has taken as imagination and institutionalized as a culture for the interpretation of history.

These concepts, however, are a priori or fundamental knowledge. Once it is considered that man constitutes the privilege and exception- that is, as the most truthful or superior animal over other creatures- he forms the value-based human history. "The truth that should be known is that the modern ages, by focusing on cosmic history as the history of man, have contradicted the ancient ages and severed the ties between nature and spirit, man and animal, the moral and the natural... If we were to take this unfortunate idea to its extreme, we would say the arrogant claim: History is nothing but the cosmic consciousness of the self" [Al-Sheikh, 2008, p.97]. From here, Nietzsche questions replacing the concept of cosmic history with that of natural and genealogical history, understood as the discussion of history before cosmic history. Since the latter has been dominated by logic, morality, and systematic man, Nietzsche dispels this concept as a rejection of methodology in history or systematics, which he sees as intentionality, teleology, consciousness, and responsibility, and he calls for consideration of what precedes this collective path.

Regarding the concept of causality, which modernists have long relied upon in their presentations of the philosophy of history, Nietzsche observes that the historian does not focus on the facts and what actually happened but rather on the event as assumed by the historian, and the reality as he believes it to be. Wherever you search for the cause, you find a hypothesis; wherever you seek the reason, it is guesswork. Nothing considered as an effect or a historical event is but a realization of the effects of an assumed event. "How astonishing are the landmarks of the historian: a world of differences, judgments, and perceptions, and a world of ghosts and shadows hovering around the obscure depths of a profoundly deep, crushed, and inaccessible reality! Are historians not people whose habit is to talk about things that exist only in their representations?" [Al-Sheikh, 2008, p.93]. What Nietzsche distinguishes here is the difference between conjecture and cause. The true cause, for Nietzsche, is the absence of cause in itself, but rather the invocation of chance as a rule that must be present, balanced, and considered as the basis for interpreting the historical course.

Nietzsche's dismantling of the concept of teleology is his way of overthrowing the vile Christian ideas that infiltrated the modern era, given that Christianity relied on the assumption of a purpose for every event and the search for conscious intent or divine conception describing the world's creation, existence, and events. The modern historical thinker inherited the rigidity of this view but left behind belief in divine explanation for an explanation based on man in a divine-like manner.

5. Considering the History of Philosophy

Since the dawn of studying history*, it did not receive great attention for what it achieves, being regarded as a mnemonic or memorization aspect- neither scientific nor epistemological from a theoretical perspective- where it operates outside the rules of logic and common consciousness. In the realm of this neglect of the movement of history or historical awareness, modernity and its philosophers began to officially and consciously consider the history of philosophy, starting with the interests of Francis Bacon, Voltaire, Condorcet, and continuing up to Marxism.

The discussion on the meaning of history continued since its use as a science in Francis Bacon's classification of sciences, where it was seen as a science concerned with memory. This opened the way for Vico to establish the spiral movement in the interpretation of history. Interest in history persisted with Kant, Hegel, and Marx, to the point that that era was described as the "fever of history" [Qawasmi, 2016], where history was read empirically and rationally, as it became a science of great importance in explaining the movement of European progress.

Hegel makes his interpretation of the movement of history a graduated progression through its stages, transforming it into a method for writing history and determining its sources. According to Hegel, history is divided into three types: original history (which is written by the historian who experiences it), theoretical history (which aims to narrate events through transmission), and philosophical history (the study of history through thought), with philosophical history being the most important, as Hegel sees it [Hegel, 1981, pp.31-38]. Even as Nietzsche later criticizes him, Hegel calls for an elevation in the view of history through reason- the spiritual history or the realization of historical consciousness**. For Hegel, the ultimate reading of history is the realization of conscious spirit, and this historical awareness is recognized in Christianity as a realistic harmony between religions, such as the harmony between Judaism and Islam, or even their alignment with rational inquiries. He also advocates for original Christianity as a civilizational model for the history of Germany.

The genealogical question is based on the demolition of metaphysics and reliance on what is meaningful, meaning that it goes beyond metaphysics as something irrelevant to the way of life; neither knowledge, history, nor logic are necessary when metaphysics is examined. Therefore, Nietzsche presents his rejection of Hegelian history as essentially Christian theology under the shadow of Judaism. From Nietzsche's perspective, Hegel returns to formations that claim God is the source of knowledge or the rational spirit, since man is reason, and the phenomenon of rationality is divine, or that description which

takes the view that God is truth and truth is divine [Nietzsche, 1974, p.283]. Nietzsche thus rejects any divine will that governs the movement of history.

Nietzsche finds in the history of philosophy nothing but scattered fragments that call for reading about philosophers' reports, sayings, and their environment, which he sees as shaping boredom and tedium since it is merely a conventional pattern full of foolish ideas. Moreover, he did not burden himself- the history of philosophy from the Hegelian perspective- with the responsibility of true critique. "In general, this critique was not a critique of philosophical schools according to whether it was possible to live by them, but rather a 'critique of words by words'" [Al-Sheikh, 2008, p.202]. Nietzsche attacks the process of generating terms as a manipulation that pretends to present a new historicism, while it has not departed from the realm of intellectual corruption: "The dull faith in invented or abandoned words in language, the preference for the rare and strange, the inclination toward an abundance of vocabulary rather than its limitation- all these are always signs of a taste that is either still lacking or has become corrupt" [Nietzsche, 2001, p.159]. Since Hegel uses many similar and overlapping terms which carry the same meanings but reproduces them to carry new meanings in history, Nietzsche views this as a departure from aesthetic taste in history.

For Nietzsche, the history of philosophy did not study the most important thing: the psychological state of the philosophers themselves. Their adherence to showcasing these doctrines led them to repress their decisive moments and prevented them from overturning existing values. He proposes a secret study of their miserable conditions, which they have discarded under the pretext of not mentioning or recording them. The significance of this is moral-divine; reading their states secretly in a negative way amounts to discovering renewal in history. "The contribution to establishing a psychology of philosophers aims to rid some of the illusions woven around them" [Al-Sheikh, 2008, p.202]. Nietzsche sees the psychological examination of philosophers' phenomena as more necessary than merely recounting historical events, as Hegel indicated in his methods of writing history.

From Nietzsche's perspective, this means looking at what has not yet been thought about, rather than what has already been considered. Otherwise, philosophers become mere slaves to ethics and theology, incapable of new creation or innovation that might overturn facts. His rejection of reason and the rational interpretation of the movement of history is summarized in his statement: "The 'good man' has been corrupted and seduced by the evil institutions (tyrants and priests)- reason is appointed in history as authority; history transcends errors, and regards the future as progress" [Nietzsche, 2011, p.44]. Progress, according to the logic of reason dominated by religion and established as ruler over the history of philosophy, has led to triviality and

decline, while failing to provide what ought to be provided. There is also a fear of breaking with convention and exploring the creation of new foundations that contradict the prevailing general condition.

One who examines Nietzsche's deconstruction of the principles of modern philosophy of history almost notices Nietzsche's lack of concern for the philosophy of history as a herald of the future. He focuses on conceptual criticism without creating parallel concepts, but rather a new practice. He distinguishes between concept and practice in the modern historian, whereas it is necessary for the historian to study events according to a sequential methodology that defines the features, characteristics, and even hypotheses of the period to find connections linking the human being as a current entity with the human of the past, in view of exchange and anticipation of the future.

Moreover, his rejection of teleology is not a healthy phenomenon in historical interpretation. Reviving absurdity and chance as explanations of history is far from realistic, since human development has always had causes that made humanity seek renewal in research, science, and life. We cannot under any circumstances consider the emergence of the Italian scientist Galileo Galilei as a chance occurrence reducible to absurdity; rather, it is the historicity of rational progress within Christianity and its interaction with Islamic culture in both its philosophical and scientific aspects.

What Hegel represents in the history of philosophy is the culmination of theorizing extended from cyclical interpretation like that of Ibn Khaldun, progress in Voltaire, through Vico's spiral development, where the dialectical method is the summary of all these interpretations. Anyone who contemplates this observes this synthesis, as dialectics concerns progress, or the history of the state, or superiority according to evolution, which aligns with making it a summary of the interpretive thought explaining the course of history, thus granting it greater philosophical realism.

It is Hegel who links the history of progress to consciousness, even in his anticipation that German wisdom will prevail. He discovered the state of the rational human and its development along the course of history. Meanwhile, Nietzsche refers all of humanity to the principles of the irrational- that is, to debauchery, the seduction of passions, the permissiveness of poor arts, and the overturning of value and scientific concepts. Consequently, Nietzsche's problematic framework departs from Hegel's domain, where the latter is a theorist of history in connection with the political and the spiritual. This explains the notable absence of a theory of the state in Nietzsche compared to Hegel, who dominated that stage with his theoretical and practical frameworks.

Nietzsche's retrieval- of overturning all values and modern manifestations by critiquing their origins and rejecting their compliance- is a demand of great importance in the search for the origin of truth, starting from skepticism

towards all identities that represented the foundations from Greek rationality, through Christian eras, up to the modern period. What is even more striking is Nietzsche's project, which gained wide influence among his followers. Nietzsche does not merely dwell on the line of critique; in his philosophical project, which adopts the new human instincts as he supposes and presents them, he starts from his interrogation of modern philosophers, who, according to Nietzsche, failed to properly shape the human being. He says: "We researchers do not know ourselves; we are ignorant of ourselves. And there is a good reason for this: we have not searched for our own selves, so how could we discover ourselves one day?" [Nietzsche, 1981, p.9].

6. Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, it becomes clear that Nietzsche's critique of religion, science, and moral values is not simply a form of pure nihilism. Rather, it represents a profound philosophical attempt to deconstruct the metaphysical foundations upon which the Western modernity system is built. Nietzsche revealed the extension of religious values, especially Christian ones, within the modern structures of science and ethics, thus placing modernity itself under scrutiny. Moreover, his genealogical method allows for a reconsideration of prevailing moral concepts and calls for a new ethics that stems from the will to life rather than its negation. Accordingly, Nietzsche's thought does not merely reject prevailing values; it questions their roots and proposes an alternative possibility for human existence based on strength, creativity, and the transcendence of traditional dichotomies such as good and evil, or reason and faith. Thus, his reading remains relevant to any project aiming to liberate humanity from metaphysical illusions that constrain freedom in the name of truth or virtue.

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