POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY: THE SEARCH FOR A JUST SOCIETY

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Abstract. This article explores the intersections between political philosophy and philosophical anthropology in the context of contemporary global challenges. Drawing on both classical sources (Plato, Hobbes, Rousseau, Marx) and modern theorists (Honneth, Habermas, Nussbaum, Latour), the study rethinks justice as a dynamic, relational, and context-sensitive concept grounded in the changing nature of the human subject. The research demonstrates that modern political strategies of justice must transcend universalist models and instead be rooted in anthropological realities-recognizing the embeddedness of individuals in cultural, social, ecological, and technological networks. The article synthesizes key theoretical perspectives on recognition, participatory democracy, intersectional justice, global redistribution, and environmental responsibility. Methodologically, the study adopts an interdisciplinary framework combining hermeneutic analysis, conceptual mapping, and critical theory. It argues that justice in the 21st century cannot be reduced to procedural fairness or resource distribution but must be understood as an ongoing negotiation of human vulnerability, plurality, and interdependence. The article concludes that philosophical anthropology provides a necessary foundation for reimagining political institutions capable of supporting inclusive, adaptive, and ecologically sustainable forms of justice in a post-global world.

Keywords: justice, philosophical anthropology, recognition, participation, intersectionality, global justice, environmental ethics, political philosophy

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ПОЛИТИКА И ФИЛОСОФСКАЯ АНТРОПОЛОГИЯ: ПОИСК СПРАВЕДЛИВОГО ОБЩЕСТВА

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Абстракт. В данной статье исследуются пересечения политической философии и философской антропологии в контексте современных глобальных вызовов. Опираясь как на классические источники (Платон, Гоббс, Руссо, Маркс), так и на современных теоретиков (Хоннет, Хабермас, Нуссбаум, Латур), исследование переосмысливает справедливость как динамическую, реляционную и контекстно-зависимую концепцию, основанную на изменяющейся природе человеческого субъекта. Исследование показывает, что современные политические стратегии справедливости должны выходить за рамки универсалистских моделей и вместо этого основываться на антропологических реалиях, признавая встроенность индивидов в культурные, социальные, экологические и технологические сети. В статье обобщены ключевые теоретические перспективы признания, демократии участия, интерсекциональной справедливости, глобального перераспределения и экологической ответственности. Методологически исследование использует междисциплинарную структуру, сочетающую герменевтический анализ, концептуальное картографирование и критическую теорию. В ней утверждается, что правосудие в 21-м веке не может быть сведено к процессуальной справедливости или распределению ресурсов, а должно пониматься как непрерывное обсуждение человеческой уязвимости, плюрализма и взаимозависимости. В статье делается вывод о том, что философская антропология обеспечивает необходимую основу для переосмысления политических институтов, способных поддерживать инклюзивные, адаптивные и экологически устойчивые формы справедливости в постглобальном мире.

Ключевые слова: справедливость, философская антропология, признание, участие, интерсекциональность, глобальная справедливость, экологическая этика, политическая философия

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SİYASƏT VƏ FƏLSƏFİ ANTROPOLOGİYA: ƏDALƏTLİ CƏMİYYƏT AXTARIŞINDA

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Abstrakt. Bu məqalə müasir qlobal çağırışlar fonunda siyasi fəlsəfə ilə fəlsəfi antropologiya arasındakı kəsişmələri tədqiq edir. Klassik mənbələrə (Platon, Hobbs, Russo, Marks) və müasir nəzəriyyəçilərə (Honneth, Habermas, Nussbaum, Latour) əsaslanaraq, ədalət anlayışı insanın dəyişkən təbiətinə əsaslanan dinamik, əlaqəli və kontekstual bir kateqoriya kimi yenidən nəzərdən keçirilir. Araşdırma göstərir ki, müasir dövrdə ədalətin siyasi strategiyaları universal modelləri aşmalı və antropoloji reallıqlara- yəni fərdin mədəni, sosial, ekoloji və texnoloji şəbəkələrdəki iştirakına əsaslanmalıdır. Məqalədə tanınma, iştirakçı demokratiya, interseksional ədalət, qlobal resursların yenidən bölüşdürülməsi və ekoloji məsuliyyət kimi əsas nəzəri yanaşmalar sintez edilir. Metodoloji olaraq, tədqiqat hermenevtik təhlil, konseptual xəritələşdirmə və tənqidi nəzəriyyəni birləşdirən interdisiplinar yanaşmanı qəbul edir. Müəllif iddia edir ki, XXI əsrdə ədalət nə yalnız prosedur bərabərliyi, nə də sadə resurs bölgüsü ilə izah oluna bilər. Ədalət insanın həssaslığı, müxtəlifliyi və qarşılıqlı asılılığı ilə daimi dialoq və uyğunlaşma prosesi kimi başa düşülməlidir. Məqalədə alınan nəticələr, fəlsəfi antropologiya əhatəli, inklüziv və ekoloji baxımdan davamlı ədalət formalarının qurulması üçün yeni siyasi təsisatların düşünülməsində əsas baza ola bilər.

Açar sözlər: ədalət, fəlsəfi antropologiya, tanınma, iştirak, interseksionallıq, qlobal ədalət, ekoloji etika, siyasi fəlsəfə

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1.Introduction

In the context of global transformations, issues of justice, political power, and human nature acquire special relevance. Pandemics, technological revolution, increasing social inequality, ecological challenges, and identity crises intensify the need to rethink traditional models of social order. Contemporary political systems face a complex set of challenges that cannot be resolved without a deep analysis of anthropological foundations.

Philosophical anthropology, by studying the fundamental characteristics of the human being, opens new perspectives for analyzing political processes and concepts of justice. Understanding humans as a dynamic, change-oriented, and historically conditioned subject allows for a rethinking of political mechanisms aimed at creating a just society.

Modern political philosophy shows a shift from universalist models of justice toward approaches based on recognition, participation, inclusivity, and flexibility. Philosophical anthropology complements this shift by emphasizing the need to consider the diversity of human experience, cultural plurality, and the fluidity of identities.

Objective. The aim of this research is to identify the interconnections between philosophical anthropology and the political concept of a just society in the context of 21st-century challenges. To achieve this aim, the following tasks are outlined: analyze the anthropological foundations of political thought; examine the transformation of the idea of justice in contemporary political philosophy; identify political mechanisms for implementing justice based on a new anthropological paradigm.

Theoretical Foundation. The study is based on the works of classical political thinkers (Aristotle, Hobbes, Rousseau), 20th-century philosophical anthropologists (Scheler, Plessner, Gehlen), as well as contemporary concepts of justice and democracy developed by J. Rawls, J. Habermas, A. Honneth, M. Nussbaum, and B. Latour. These authors are considered key representatives of various approaches to understanding human and political order, enabling a reconstruction of the evolution of the concept of justice considering anthropological changes. The research relies on an interpretation of the human as a relational, historically situated being capable of moral self-determination, which becomes the foundation for constructing new, adaptive political models.

Methodology. This study adopts an interdisciplinary approach, combining philosophical, political, and sociological analysis. The methodological framework includes hermeneutic analysis – used to interpret classical and contemporary philosophical texts (Plato, Scheler, Rousseau, Arendt, Honneth, Nussbaum, etc.), revealing the underlying anthropological assumptions within political thought. Historical-philosophical method – applied to trace the

evolution of the concepts of justice and the political from antiquity to the 21st century, in the context of shifts in the anthropological paradigm. Critical analysis – directed at comparing different models of justice and forms of power (liberal, communitarian, perfectionist, ecocentric) from the perspective of their anthropological foundations. Conceptual mapping – used to analyze key concepts (justice, participation, recognition, subjectivity), their intersections, and transformations in contemporary theoretical debates.

Thus, the study aims to develop a theoretical foundation for rethinking political strategies for building a just society considering new anthropological realities.

2.Anthropological Foundations of Political Systems

The origins of political organization are commonly traced back to Antiquity. Historians identify the roots of democracy and public deliberation among the ancient Greeks, while the Roman tradition emphasizes the importance of law. Legal scholars analyzing Plato's Republic note the absence of democracy or a state in the modern sense. The Greek polis does not correspond to the liberal notion of civil society; its cohesion was based on a principle of competition and upheld by masculine virtues- courage, heroism, honor, a sense of duty, and responsibility.

In the Middle Ages, the concept of politics emerged as a complex synthesis of feudal service, religious norms, economic practices, and the rules of rural and urban communities. A symbolic example is the conflict between papacy and the empire, accompanied by the development of the idea of the political body model of a hierarchical society in which all participants are interconnected as elements of a single mechanism.

With the rise of nation-states, the notion of politics acquired new features. Sovereignty and autocracy became central themes. Although monarchs were not deified in the strict sense, coronation was perceived as an act of divine blessing, and the king as God's earthly representative. Even during the era of deism, when God was envisioned as a clockmaker, absolute power was modeled on theological analogies. Spectacle and visual representation played a key role in legitimizing authority: courtly opulence, the construction of magnificent palaces, the creation of gardens, exquisite jewelry, and ceremonial dress. Monarchs were addressed using formulas evoking the radiance of crowns, purple robes, and the splendor of palaces, reinforcing a hierarchical order based on the values of honor and dignity. However, as court life grew more complex, this ethos underwent transformation.

The Enlightenment marked a rupture between society and the state. As the third estate gained strength, a new understanding of the political emerged, grounded in the ideals of parliamentary democracy. The liberal bourgeoisie

became a new class seeking to resolve public issues through debate and negotiation.

By the early 20th century, numerous approaches to understanding the state existed. Legal scholars asserted its supremacy over society, linking the nature of the state to the rule of law. Romantic writers, on the contrary, saw fraternity and comradeship as foundational to the state. Liberals and anarchists emphasized that the essence of the state lies in power and domination.

Carl Schmitt proposed viewing the political through the lens of the friend-enemy distinction, akin to morality's distinction between good and evil. In his view, the differentiation between friend and enemy expresses the highest degree of human unity or disunity [Schmitt, 2007]. A political enemy is not an economic competitor or ideological opponent. Concepts like "state", "society," "class", or "sovereignty" remain empty if no real enemy is identified. Even in party struggles- however degenerate- the fundamental distinction between "us" and "them" persists.

Thus, conflict is a fundamental condition of political life. War represents the extreme form of enmity- armed conflict. However, the command to "love your enemies" does not apply to external foes and does not imply betraying one's homeland, for example, in favor of Islam. At the same time, Schmitt rejected wars waged for economic or religious reasons, considering them devoid of political meaning. He defended the concept of sovereignty and criticized syndicalism and pluralism, which spread after the collapse of absolutist state forms. Although politics do not directly derive from religious, economic, or moral spheres, conflicts in these areas may take on a political dimension when they lead to divisions between friends and enemies. For instance, a religious community that goes to war becomes a political entity. Similarly, struggles between corporations, trade unions, or classes also become politicized.

Every individual, as well as any economic or political structure, represents an autonomous unit, for which the external is perceived as alien. However, it is crucial to remember that the surrounding environment is a necessary condition for existence, implying the need to account for processes of exchange and interaction. It should be noted that ritual clashes- be they wars or village brawls- are not always based on absolute friend-enemy oppositions. Young people from neighboring villages often fought during festivals simply out of tradition. Similar forms of organized conflict are sometimes observed between neighboring states. This is, of course, not an ideal form of interaction, but, as I.Kant wrote, such conflicts are a kind of natural ruse leading humanity to peace through trials.

In peaceful conditions, each person is focused on daily concerns, participating in various social institutions and performing associated roles.

This leads to a key issue- the need to coordinate different obligations, such as reconciling party membership with religious practice or professional duties with moral demands.

The modern state has lost the image of the "universal person" or "mechanism" that turns citizens into faceless components. Nevertheless, in times of crisis, it is the state- not trade unions or other associations- that has the capacity to mobilize the population. It differs from ordinary associations, whether religious, economic, or professional. The state is not merely a "night watchman," nor is it a special type of society or federation of unions. From a conservative perspective, liberalism has lost the ability to understand politics as the distinction between friend and enemy. In normal times, the state's task is to maintain internal order and provide security. However, in a state of emergency, the state declares war. Unlike external wars, civil war flares up suddenly and signifies a crisis of state integrity.

External wars can be either offensive or defensive. Aggressors often justify their actions with religious, economic, or moral reasons, such as the defense of human rights. Nevertheless, such motives cannot justify aggression, since forcing citizens to fight for alien interests is inhumane and senseless.

An entirely different situation arises when the threat becomes real: the enemy encroaches upon the country and the home of every individual. In this case, war takes on an existential character and may be justified as the defense of existence itself. Only the people subjected to aggression have the right to identify their enemy and decide to resist. Since the friend-enemy distinction is made by humans, the problem of the political must be considered in an anthropological context. The enemy is not simply the other or the foreigner, but one who genuinely threatens our existence. The foundation of political opposition is based on ideas about human nature- good or evil. Some believe that animalistic impulses lead people to evil, while others argue that the soul, uncorrupted by civilization, is inherently good.

Conservative thinkers who developed theories of the state started from the idea of original sin, human imperfection, and moral corruption. Those who believe in the goodness of human nature tend to reject the need for the state and rely on self-regulating society. Thus, Thomas Paine claimed that society is born from people's rational needs, while the state arises from their sins. For moralists, a community of virtuous individuals should be ruled by peace and harmony.

The liberal tradition focuses on resisting state power to expand individual freedoms. Society is conceived as a space of production and exchange, sustained through competition and open public discussion. The people are transformed into public workers and consumers- and mechanisms of power are

exercised through propaganda and mass consciousness manipulation. Unlike the state, which in a critical moment may demand the ultimate sacrifice- one's life- liberalism declares that only the individual has the right to dispose of their own life.

Liberals sought to free the market from political and moral control, subjecting politics to the demands of law and ethics. In practice, however, liberalism did not eliminate politics but transformed it: the economy became a new arena of political struggle. This corresponds to the logic of economic imperialism. Instead of wars, economic sanctions, trade blockades, credit and resource restrictions, and currency attacks are used. In some cases, punitive operations and so-called "peacekeeping missions" are conducted. The adversary is no longer called the enemy but is labeled a violator of human rights. The idea of the rule of law serves to reinforce the existing distribution of political power.

Thus, the question of the nature of politics remains open. Some define it as the art of governing the masses, others reduce it to diplomacy- the ability to achieve goals in international relations. Still others see politics as the expression of class interests and party struggles. A fourth group emphasizes the role of public debate on key societal issues, viewing politics in the spirit of deliberative democracy.

The modern concept of politics increasingly dissolves into economic, social, legal, moral, and rational dimensions. Amid mass apathy, some even speak of the "death of politics". However, acute needs for political decisions arise in times of societal crisis, when laws lose their force and sanctions become ineffective. In such moments, the masses mobilize, and charismatic leaders, prophets, and commanders emerge, calling for decisive action. Therefore, understanding politics solely as public discourse should not overshadow the conservative awareness of power as a force capable of protecting society from internal and external threats.

Ideologies, as programs of action, depend on the balance of power and emerge under the influence of historical circumstances, making them not always logical or consistent. For this reason, this textbook emphasizes not so much the description of political institutions as the anthropological analysis- the study of the cultural and historical foundations of human political activity. Even if the state resembles an impersonal machine, its components are people. This requires accounting for the consequences of political decisions for human life. Politics is not a spectacle but a serious activity that may not always conform to strict truths and moral norms- but it must not turn into a cynical game.

3.Philosophical Anthropology and Democracy

Philosophical anthropology makes a significant contribution to rethinking democracy beyond classical liberal concepts, where the human being is viewed as an autonomous and rational subject. Contemporary anthropological approaches show that human participation in politics is shaped not only by rational beliefs, but also through social, emotional, and cultural interactions.

From this perspective, democracy appears not so much as a set of procedures, but as a living fabric of recognition, mutual involvement, and joint action. Existential philosophy reinforces this approach by proposing to view political participation as a mode of being that unfolds through relations with the Other.

Gabriel Marcel, in Being and Having, emphasizes that human subjectivity is formed through the experience of encountering a space of trust, empathy, and mutual responsibility [Marcel, 1951]. Political activity, in his view, cannot be reduced to voting or participation in institutions: it is an existential dialogue through which each person's dignity is affirmed.

Martin Buber takes a similar position in Ich und Du, developing the concept of dialogical existence. His model of the "I–Thou" relationship describes the political sphere as one founded on genuine communication, where recognizing the Other as equal is the primary act of democracy [Buber, 1970].

Hannah Arendt, developing these ideas, argues that the public space is the arena for the manifestation of human freedom. In The Human Condition, she insists that the political exists insofar as there is collective action forming a shared space of meaning [Arendt, 1958]. Thus, democracy is understood as the practice of collectively creating the world, rather than merely a tool for governance.

Modern scholars, including Seymour Lipset, emphasize that democratic institutions are stable only in societies where the corresponding anthropological, cultural, and moral foundations have been established [Lipset, 1959]. This underscores the importance of philosophical anthropology as a foundation for democratic order.

Human rights, the cornerstone of modern democracy, also require anthropological re-examination. In Development as Freedom, Amartya Sen understands rights as expressions of real individual capabilities, which must be institutionally supported and adapted to cultural context, especially in conditions of inequality [Sen, 1999].

Vandana Shiva, for her part, expands the concept of democracy to the ecological dimension, introducing the term Earth Democracy. She argues that humans cannot be considered apart from nature, and the destruction of ecosystems leads to new forms of injustice [Shiva, 2005]. Therefore, without recognizing the rights of nature, sustainable social justice cannot be achieved.

4.Deliberative Model of Democracy: Philosophical Foundations and Contemporary Challenges

Deliberative democracy is one of the key developments in democratic theory in the 20th and 21st centuries. At its core is the idea that the legitimacy of political decisions arises not from simple voting procedures, but from a process of rational public discussion involving free and equal citizens.

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls argued that principles of justice can be justified under the "veil of ignorance", where individuals, not knowing their future social position, agree on fair rules of interaction [Rawls, 1971]. He believed that democracy implies a conscious limitation of private interests for the sake of the common good and equal access to political processes.

Jürgen Habermas develops this idea within his discourse ethics. In Between Facts and Norms, he argues that justice is possible only when there are regulated procedures of communication ensuring equal participation in decision-making processes [Habermas, 1996]. According to Habermas, a democratic society is based on rational consensus, not on mere aggregation of preferences.

In recent decades, deliberative democracy has evolved further thanks to digital technologies. Increased access to information, the rise of electronic platforms, and participation in debates via social networks stimulate new forms of civic engagement. However, studies show that the digital environment also creates new risks: fragmentation of the public sphere, declining trust, manipulation, and the exclusion of low-income and marginalized groups from the deliberative process.

Moreover, the deliberative model depends on a high level of legal culture and political maturity in society. In conditions of social tension, low education levels, and distrust of institutions, formal procedures of discussion can become ritualistic and devoid of genuine participation. This raises the question: is authentic deliberation possible in the context of deep inequality and cultural polarization? Some researchers propose the concept of "deliberative inclusive design", focusing not only on equal access, but also on actively supporting the inclusion of vulnerable groups- through facilitation, educational programs, and adaptation of discursive formats.

Thus, deliberative democracy remains a promising but fragile model, dependent on anthropological, cultural, and technological conditions. In this context, philosophical anthropology becomes crucial: it allows us to account for the changing nature of the subject, emotionality, bounded rationality, and embeddedness in social and cultural practices. Democracy is not merely a procedure, but a form of collective subjectivity that develops in the space of recognition and participation.

5.The Transformation of the Idea of Justice in Political Philosophy

Justice has occupied a central place in political philosophy since antiquity. For Plato and Aristotle, it was not only a moral virtue but also a principle of harmonious social order. Plato linked justice to a hierarchy of abilities and the functional distribution of duties, while Aristotle saw it as a manifestation of proportionality and equality within differences [Plato, 1997; Aristotle, 1996].

In the modern era, a radical shift occurs justice begins to be understood not as a cosmic or natural order, but as the result of human agreement. In the social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, justice arises from the rational union of individuals for the common good and the protection of rights. Thomas Hobbes introduced the concept of the state of nature, in which humans exist before the establishment of political order. He argued that all people are naturally equal- and that this very equality, in his view, leads to competition and violence: the "war of all against all" (bellum omnium contra omnes). However, reason compels people to make a pact and transfer part of their rights to a sovereign who guarantees safety and order. Importantly, in this construction, rights are primary, they precede the state and serve as the basis for its legitimacy. Hobbes replaces the ancient notion of "the good" with that of rights, marking a shift from teleological thinking to legal individualism [Hobbes, 1996].

Jean-Jacques Rousseau took a different path. He also referred to the state of nature but saw humans as originally good and capable of morality. In his view, problems arise not in nature but in social and political institutions that distort natural freedom. His concept of the "general will" attempts to reconcile individual freedom with political unity. A law created by the will of all becomes an expression of collective freedom. However, critics point out the paradox in Rousseau's theory: in seeking to preserve freedom, he justifies a form of collective authority that can suppress individual preferences for the sake of the common good- thus walking a fine line between democracy and authoritarianism [Rousseau, 1997].

Ernst Cassirer, interpreting Rousseau, emphasized the shift from rational universalism to the cultural and symbolic conditioning of the human being [Cassirer, 1945]. This turn is further developed in the 20th century, particularly in Clifford Geertz's symbolic anthropology, which holds that political subjectivity is formed in local cultural contexts rather than in an abstract space of rights [Geertz, 1973]. Thus, ideas of justice evolve from universal norms to an understanding of human embeddedness in specific cultural, historical, and social conditions. This shift paves the way for contemporary models of justice oriented toward recognition of differences, participation, and redistribution of opportunities- not merely resources.

6. Contemporary Concepts of Justice in Political Thought

Modern political philosophy moves away from abstract, universalist notions of justice. Even before the pandemic, signs of a democratic crisis had become apparent- the rise of anti-liberal and anti-globalist sentiments, xenophobia, and populism strengthened authoritarian tendencies, while the pandemic itself further intensified these dynamics, exposing deep ideological contradictions and prompting philosophical reflections on life strategies amid global instability [Adigozalova, Abasov, 2020]. Four major directions in 21st-century justice theory are discussed below:

6.1. Politics of Recognition

In the works of Axel Honneth and Charles Taylor, justice is interpreted as the demand for recognition of individual and collective identities. Honneth identifies three levels of recognition required for a just society: interpersonal (in love and friendship), legal (equal rights and protections), and social (value of individual contributions to the common good). From this perspective, injustice is not only economic inequality but also social invisibility- neglect, devaluation, or humiliation of the subject [Honneth, 1995].

Charles Taylor expands on this view, emphasizing that identity is formed in dialogue with others, and recognition is an existential need of the modern subject [Taylor, 1994]. Without societal recognition, a person loses a sense of self-worth.

Closely related is communitarianism, a political philosophy that emerged in the 1980s in Anglo-American thought as a response to liberalism. Communitarians (Taylor, M. Sandel, M. Walzer, A. MacIntyre) argue for the priority of the community over individual freedom and abstract personal rights. More than a theory, communitarianism also became a social movement in the U.S. advocating traditional American values.

Philosophically, communitarianism proposes a distinctive worldview and moral structure. It rests on a form of idealism and critiques liberal values through elevated anti-individualism- emphasizing care for the common good as the highest societal goal. Another defining feature is moral perfectionism: citizens must develop virtues to sustain the community. This diverges sharply from liberalism (e.g., Rawls), which defends the equal validity of all lifestyles. Communitarians argue that the state should actively shape the moral environment, steering citizens toward ethical standards.

6.2. Intersectional Justice

The concept of intersectional justice, developed by Kimberlé Crenshaw and other feminist theorists, expands the politics of recognition. Crenshaw asserts that injustice arises at the intersection of various axes- gender, race, class,

sexuality, disability- forming complex structures of oppression [Crenshaw, 1991].

Intersectionality views the individual as a multidimensional subject whose unique circumstances cannot be understood through a single lens of discrimination. This calls for more sensitive and adaptive policies to dismantle structural barriers and ensure meaningful participation of diverse groups.

This approach affirms that justice must consider multiple identities and the interplay of cultural, social, economic, and political factors that shape an individual's position in society. It aligns closely with the philosophical-anthropological approach to human nature as complex and context-dependent.

6.3. Theories of Global Justice

The issue of justice is increasingly projected onto the global scale, where redistribution of resources and the guarantee of basic human rights across borders become urgent. Thomas Pogge argues that the current global order perpetuates poverty and inequality, and that justice requires global redistribution of resources and responsibilities [Pogge, 2002].

Martha Nussbaum, developing her capabilities approach, proposes an Aristotelian model of social democracy that focuses not only on redistribution but on creating institutional conditions for individuals to realize their full potential [Nussbaum, 2011].

Together with Amartya Sen, Nussbaum developed this theory at the intersection of economics and ethics in the late 20th century, as an alternative to utilitarianism and resource-based egalitarianism. Instead of measuring well-being by preferences or resources, the capabilities approach focuses on real opportunities to lead a flourishing life.

Compared with Rawls's deontological liberal egalitarianism, Nussbaum's Aristotelian egalitarianism seeks to eliminate the root causes of poverty and inequality. While liberals emphasize redistribution ("resourcism"), Aristotelians focus on institution-building to prevent injustice ("institutionalism").

Nussbaum insists that the state must go beyond aid- it must ensure lifelong access to healthcare, education, and democratic participation. Her program includes reforms in property, labor relations, environmental policy, family support, civic involvement, and cultural development.

In her essay Aristotelian Social Democracy, Nussbaum outlines four key areas for practical implementation of social justice. Some forms of labor are incompatible with a dignified life and must be changed. Property must serve the common good. Civic participation is valuable. Education is foundational for all human capabilities. Unlike liberal theories, which focus on maximizing

preferences, Nussbaum's approach centers on quality of life, rooted in ancient notions of the good.

6.4.Environmental Justice

Environmental justice expands ethical consideration to include non-human actors, nature, animals, future generations. Bruno Latour argues that in the Anthropocene, humanity must recognize nature not as a passive object but as an equal political actor [Latour, 2004].

Latour insists that unless humanity abandons the outdated modernist paradigm that subordinates nature, it cannot address growing global threats. In the Anthropocene, nature responds actively- and sometimes violently- to human intervention. He considers this awareness a key achievement of the ecological movement.

This critique of anthropocentrism calls for a new paradigm of human-nature interdependence and survival strategies in the face of climate crisis.

Philosopher Jane Bennett expands this idea through her theory of vibrant matter [Bennett, 2010]. She argues that even inanimate objects possess a form of agency- a vitality or "will". Matter, she claims, influences events and participates in shaping reality.

Bennett proposes viewing reality as a web of interactions between human and non-human elements, erasing the boundary between living and non-living. The world is no longer a backdrop for human action but a co-participant in shared existence.

7.Discussion

The discussion of the concepts presented in this study reveals several overarching themes that shape the contemporary understanding of justice in the political context through the lens of philosophical anthropology.

First, the transformation of the idea of justice highlights a shift from a universalist, abstract model to an understanding of justice as a dynamic, contextual process rooted in human subjectivity, social interaction, and historical specificity. This transition signifies a departure from neo-Kantian abstraction in favor of intersubjective, relational justice focused on recognition and participation.

Second, it has become evident that philosophical anthropology functions as a methodological bridge between theories of justice and concrete political practices. Considering the human being as an open, dependent, "eccentric" entity allows for a rethinking of mechanisms of power, sovereignty, and rights toward more flexible, inclusive, and empathetically grounded forms. This is evident, for instance, in the theories of Honneth and Nussbaum, where recognition and capabilities are not treated as abstract categories but as practical preconditions for just political life.

Third, the examined concepts of justice (politics of recognition, intersectionality, global and environmental justice) demonstrate that justice cannot be conceived without addressing the structural vulnerability of the subject, their embodiment, cultural identity, and embeddedness in networks of interaction with other people, nature, and technological environments. Contemporary political realities- from climate disasters to digital inequality- preclude any return to former universalist foundations. Justice must be understood not as an "ideal", but as a practice of co-presence and constant adaptation- within a fragmented, unstable, and identity-diverse world.

8.Results

The study has led to the following theoretical and conceptual findings: it has substantiated the necessity of rethinking political models of justice through an anthropological paradigm, where the subject is understood as an open, changeable, historically and culturally conditioned being. Conceptual links have been identified between philosophical anthropology and political philosophy: through recognition, participation, embodiment, institutional embeddedness, and moral vulnerability. It has been shown that different models of justice (liberal, communitarian, perfectionist, ecocentric) are based on different anthropological assumptions about the human being, which requires a careful analysis of the premises of each. The insufficiency of procedural and formal models of democracy without anthropological grounding has been analyzed- particularly without considering the emotional, embodied, cultural, and ecological dimensions of subjectivity. It has been demonstrated that contemporary justice demands flexible, network-based, and dialogical political forms capable of accommodating a multiplicity of life-worlds.

9.Conclusion

Philosophical anthropology, by returning political philosophy's focus to the real- not abstract- human being, opens the way to rethinking justice as a process embodied in cultural, social, technological, and ecological practices. Justice in the 21st century can no longer be reduced to ideas of rational consensus, equal opportunity, or universal rights. It must be sensitive to difference, open to mutual recognition, and responsive to the challenges of vulnerability, fragility, and instability.

This necessitates a rethinking not only of political institutions but of the very image of the human at the center of political thought.

Philosophical anthropology affirms justice is not only a question of "what should be distributed and to whom", but also a question of who the human being is, what they are becoming, and what kind of world can be a society in which they are recognized. The justice of the future is not an abstract normative

ideal but a practice of co-presence, compatibility, and co-participation. Only by acknowledging the interdependence of people, cultures, generations, and species can we speak of a just world- where not only rights, but also relationships are recognized, not only freedoms, but also responsibilities.

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