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CURRICULUM CRISIS BETWEEN NATURAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES

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Abstract. The European Renaissance marked the rise of scientific materialistic philosophies that focused on understanding the universe through the experimental scientific method. This approach aligned with the rapid advancements in science and technology. Logical positivism, which sought to challenge metaphysics, emphasized the importance of induction as the primary method for scientific inquiry. This shift made induction central to the philosophy of science. However, there are fields, especially those related to human phenomena, where this scientific approach cannot be applied easily due to inherent epistemological challenges. Despite these difficulties, there is still a strong push to adopt scientific methods in these areas. Scholars argue that humanities should follow the example set by the natural sciences and work to establish their relevance in the broader scientific scope. It is important to note that some phenomena relate to sensory reality, such as those studied in natural sciences, which are open to empirical investigation. On the other hand, non-material phenomena, such as historical, social, and psychological events, are linked to human reality. These phenomena were also separated from philosophy, which created further complexity. Human sciences, particularly those studying human behavior, deal with moral and psychological issues involving free will, making them more difficult to study compared to inanimate matter.

Keywords: Curriculum, Humanities, Natural Sciences, Interpretation, Comprehension

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КРИЗИС УЧЕБНЫХ ПРОГРАММ МЕЖДУ ЕСТЕСТВЕННЫМИ И ГУМАНИТАРНЫМИ НАУКАМИ

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Абстракт. Европейское Возрождение ознаменовалось подъемом научно-материалистических философий, сосредоточенных на познании вселенной посредством экспериментального научного метода. Данный подход соответствовал стремительному развитию науки и техники. Логический позитивизм, стремившийся поставить под сомнение метафизику, акцентировал значение индукции как основного метода научного познания, делая её центральным элементом философии науки. Однако существуют области, особенно связанные с человеческими феноменами, где подобный научный подход не может быть применен с легкостью из-за присущих им эпистемологических трудностей. Несмотря на это, наблюдается устойчивое стремление внедрять научные методы и в данных сферах. Ученые утверждают, что гуманитарные науки должны следовать примеру естественных наук и стремиться утвердить свою значимость в более широком научном контексте. Важно подчеркнуть, что часть феноменов, как, например, изучаемые в естественных науках, связаны с чувственной реальностью и открыты для эмпирического исследования. С другой стороны, нематериальные феномены- такие как исторические, социальные и психологические события- тесно сопряжены с человеческой реальностью. Их отделение от философии лишь усложнило ситуацию. Гуманитарные науки, особенно исследующие человеческое поведение, имеют дело с моральными и психологическими проблемами, включающими фактор свободной воли, что делает их изучение значительно более трудным по сравнению с исследованием неодушевленной материи.

Ключевые слова: учебная программа, гуманитарные науки, естественные науки, интерпретация, понимание

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TƏBİƏT ELMLƏRİ VƏ HUMANİTAR ELMLƏR ARASINDA KURİKULUM BÖHRANI

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Abstrakt. Avropa Renessansı, kainatı eksperimental elmi metod vasitəsilə anlamağa yönəlmiş elmi-materialist fəlsəfələrin yüksəlişi ilə xarakterizə olunur. Bu yanaşma elm və texnologiyanın sürətli inkişafı ilə üst-üstə düşmüşdür. Metafizikani sorğulamağı hədəfləyən məntiqi pozitivizm, elmi tədqiqatın əsas üsulu kimi induksiyanın əhəmiyyətini ön plana çıxararaq onu elm fəlsəfəsinin mərkəzinə çevirdi. Bununla belə, xüsusilə insan fenomenləri ilə bağlı sahələrdə bu elmi yanaşmanın tətbiqi bilik nəzəriyyəsi ilə bağlı daxili çətinliklərə görə asan deyil. Çətinliklərə baxmayaraq, bu sahələrdə də elmi metodların tətbiqinə güclü meyl mövcuddur. Alimlər hesab edirlər ki, humanitar elmlər təbiət elmlərinin nümunəsini izləməli və geniş elmi çərçivədə öz aktuallığını təsdiq etməlidirlər. Qeyd etmək lazımdır ki, bəzi fenomenlər (məsələn, təbiət elmlərində öyrənilənlər) empirik tədqiqata açıq olan hissi reallıqla bağlıdır. Digər tərəfdən, tarixi, sosial və psixoloji hadisələr kimi qeyri-maddi fenomenlər insan reallığı ilə bağlıdır. Bu fenomenlərin fəlsəfədən ayrılması əlavə mürəkkəblik yaratmışdır. Xüsusən insan davranışını öyrənən humanitar elmlər əxlaqi və psixoloji məsələlərlə – azad iradə amili ilə bağlı mürəkkəb problemlərlə üz-üzədir və bu, cansız materiyanın öyrənilməsindən daha çətin bir prosesdir.

Açar sözlər: Kurikulum, Humanitar elmlər, Təbiət elmləri, Təfsir, Anlama

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1.Introduction

The history of philosophy is closely linked to the development of knowledge itself. All fields of study, including sciences, were once integral parts of philosophy. For a long time, science and philosophy were considered overlapping concepts. However, a key turning point in modern thought occurred with the independence of scientific disciplines and the separation of science from philosophy. After this, the focus of study shifted away from metaphysical concerns to the tangible, physical reality involved in the production of things. The first science to separate from philosophy was astronomy, with Johannes Kepler's work marking its independence. Later, psychology became its own discipline when Wilhelm Wundt established the first experimental laboratory. This led to the specialization and partiality of sciences. Each scientific field developed a specific subject of study, with a unified method: induction. Induction became the essential approach for distinguishing between science and non-science. Despite criticisms and opposition from some, such as Charley, who rejected philosophy and referred to it as "Wade Bassos philosophy", and Carl Buber, who opposed the principle of verification, induction remained the foundational approach.

As a result, epistemological obstacles emerged, highlighting the need for a rethinking of the concept of experience. Questions arise: To what extent can the inductive approach be regarded as a valid scientific method? Are all phenomena amenable to empirical scientific study? Is it time to redefine the meaning of experience, expanding its scope to include human phenomena? Can human behavior truly be studied experimentally?.

2.Induction and Its Relationship to Science

Induction was considered the only valid method for building scientific knowledge, moving from specific observations to general conclusions about future occurrences. This process starts with partial issues, and through inductive reasoning, broader generalizations are made. While ancient Greece focused on the theoretical aspects of knowledge, Western civilization later emphasized practical applications. Francis Bacon (1561-1626) laid the foundations of scientific induction in his work *The New Organon*, critiquing earlier forms of inference. His ideas were anticipated by the 12th-century priest Roger Bacon.

Modern physics reached significant advancements with figures like Galileo (1564-1642) and Isaac Newton (1642-1727). Their work, particularly the use of mathematics as the universal language of science, was groundbreaking. Contributions from Arab scholars such as Jabir ibn Hayyan (721-810 CE) and Ibn al-Haytham (965-1039 CE) were also crucial in the development of science. Historians of science agree that "modern natural science advanced significantly after Copernicus (1473-1543) developed the heliocentric

hypothesis. This period marked the flourishing of empiricism, especially at the University of Vienna, due to the influence of Ernst Mach. The development continued with Ludwig Boltzmann, and in 1922, Maurice Schlick (1882-1963) became the chair of inductive sciences, gathering scholars like Frederick Eisman and Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970). These scholars sought to establish a scientific philosophy free from metaphysical assumptions. They adopted the principle of verification, which emphasized empirical reality as the basis for verifying the validity of scientific claims" (Muhammad Thabit al-Fandi, 1994, p.265). Schlick's famous phrase, "In order to understand an issue, we must be able to accurately refer to individual cases that make the case truthful, as well as the cases that make it false. These cases are the facts of experience. It is the experience that decides the truth of the case or its lies" (Al-Fandi, 1994, p.201), highlights the role of experience in verifying scientific knowledge.

This demonstrates the importance of the experimental approach in the verification process. Bacon outlined several steps for scientific induction, beginning with observation. There are two types of observation: simple, ordinary observation, which is driven by curiosity and involves sensory perception, and scientific observation, which is more complex and controlled. In this second type, phenomena are observed in their natural state without manipulation. Next is the formulation of a hypothesis, which serves as a temporary solution or proposal that is both realistic and experimental. Afterward, the experimental phase begins, where the phenomenon is studied in a laboratory setting using scientific tools, with an emphasis on repeatability to confirm the hypothesis's validity. The final step is the development of a law, which seeks to establish relationships between phenomena and create a generalizable, mathematical formulation. This law should be predictive and generalizable. "The process begins with organized observation of natural phenomena to be researched... A hypothesis is a scientific explanation that the researcher proposes and then attempts to verify experimentally... During the experimentation phase, phenomena are placed under controlled conditions, with as much variability as possible. From these experiments, partial laws emerge, which seem independent of one another, and ultimately lead to a general law" (Ibrahim Mustafa Ibrahim, 1999, p.180).

Although contemporary physics has moved away from the principle of determinism, which suggests that identical conditions lead to identical outcomes, this principle remains valid for macro-physical phenomena (large-scale phenomena). However, when it comes to micro-physical phenomena (extremely small phenomena), this principle no longer holds. This shift was addressed by Max Planck (1858-1947) in his development of quantum physics, as well as by Albert Einstein (1879-1955) through his uncertainty principle. These discoveries highlighted the limitations of deterministic models and led

to a reliance on the deductive hypothetical approach. "Even pure physics, without experimental or practical physics – which is a deductive hypothetical system – appears, from a formal perspective, to be closer to mathematics. From the standpoint of procedural approaches, pure physics is concerned with mathematical consistency and the deductive power of hypotheses" (Yemeniy Tarif Al-Khouli, 2012, pp.24-25).

3.The Concept of Human Sciences and the Difference Between Them and the Natural Sciences

The term "human sciences" refers to disciplines focused on human reality. These sciences study human behavior, psychological conditions, social interactions, and institutions (Ahmed Abdel-Jabbar Fadel, Dr.C, p.587). The human sciences are often called "moral sciences" because they explore human activities from historical, social, and psychological perspectives.

The emergence of the human sciences in the nineteenth century was an attempt to distinguish them from philosophy, which had previously encompassed all forms of knowledge. As a result, the human sciences became specialized in the study of human beings, particularly those with language and consciousness. Michel Foucault describes this focus: "*The human sciences are directed to man as a living being, who speaks and produces. Since he is a living being, he grows, has functions, and feels needs. The place of the humanities can then be determined in relation to sciences investigating life, work, and language*" (Foucault, 1990, p. 288).

Unlike the natural sciences, which predict and control natural phenomena, the human sciences deal with the study of human beings and their behaviors. For instance, historical events, such as wars or acts of heroism, are of little practical use in the present or future. The goal of human studies is not necessarily to predict or control but rather to understand the past and shape the identities of individuals. Human studies form the ego in relation to others and the social groups they belong to, creating an understanding of human behavior over time. In contrast, the natural sciences view empirical facts as tools to predict future occurrences by analogy (Lucien Goldmann, 1970-1913). He elaborates on the distinction between the two: "Historical and human sciences are not like the physical and chemical sciences, a study of facts external to people, facts of a world to which their action is directed. It is, on the contrary, a study of the act itself, its structure, and the aspirations that drive it, along with the transformations it undergoes. Therefore, the study of history should not be limited to conscious phenomena" (Lucien Goldmann, 1996, p.59). This difference arises from the unique characteristics and nature of each phenomenon.

Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908-2009) argued that the human sciences had initially lagged behind experimental sciences. However, by the nineteenth

century, the situation began to change as experimental sciences advanced in their methodologies. This shift allowed the human sciences to gain greater importance, as they began to address and attempt to solve pressing human problems (Ahmed Abdel-Jabbar Fadel, p.588).

Michel Foucault's (1926-1984) position on the humanities, which denies their possibility of existing as independent sciences, stems from his postmodern structuralist perspective. He rejects the traditional notion of the self or man as a stable, autonomous entity. This view is evident in his historical ontology, which argues that to understand the cognitive characteristics of a specific period, we must turn to archives or documents from that time, without attributing them to their authors. In Foucault's view, it is not the individual self but rather discourse that represents truth. "The humanities were folded under philosophy, and with the beginning of the eighteenth century, these sciences began to be independent because they wanted to make man a studyable subject" [Muhammad Ibn Siba', 2020, p.556]. Foucault's conception of the scientific problem in the humanities highlights the challenges these disciplines face compared to the natural sciences. While the natural sciences can easily rely on experimentation, studying human phenomena objectively proves more difficult due to the unique characteristics of these phenomena [Najafov, 2020].

The human phenomenon, particularly when it pertains to historical, social, or psychological incidents, presents several challenges. These challenges distinguish it from natural phenomena and complicate its study. The main characteristics of humanphenomenainclude:

- **Historical events** are defined by specific times and places, making them unique and unrepeatable. If an event were to repeat, it would occur with new variables.
- Scholars studying historical incidents cannot be certain about the validity of their assumptions through scientific experimentation, which makes it impossible to establish scientific laws.
- **Psychological events** present difficulties because they are not fixed phenomena. They are concerned with revealing human behaviors, which vary over time and cannot be observed in a specific location as natural phenomena can.
- The human phenomenon is inherently **complex** and **multifaceted**, making it difficult to study in a straightforward manner.
- **Conscious and voluntary behaviors** are irregular and do not recur in a predictable manner.
- The human phenomenon is **qualitative and descriptive**, preventing it from being formulated in a precise mathematical or quantitative language, such as that used in natural sciences.

- Human phenomena, whether historical, social, or psychological, are **subject to subjective judgments**- such as personal identity, affiliation, and personality- which complicates efforts to achieve objectivity, unlike the more predictable and stable nature of natural phenomena.
- Human phenomena are **moral** in nature, tied to human reality and inner psychological states. This connection makes it impossible to observe them scientifically in the same way as natural phenomena, and they cannot be experimentally tested. In contrast to natural phenomena, which can be studied through observation and experimentation, the study of human behavior lacks these methods, making it challenging to formulate laws based on prediction and generalization.
- The principle of **determinism**- which asserts that the same conditions will always produce the same results- does not apply to human phenomena. Historical doctrines argue that the success of generalization in the natural sciences is due to the regularity and persistence of natural events. For example, the regular cycle of day and night or the changing of seasons is predictable and consistent. However, this consistency does not hold for human phenomena, as circumstances and causes change over time. Even in cases like divorce, the same reasons may apply to two different families but lead to different outcomes due to individual free will.
- The **inaccuracy of predictions** is a significant issue in the study of human phenomena. Although prediction is a central task in the natural sciences, it is not as feasible in the study of human behavior. This underlines the need for reconsidering and adapting traditional approaches to the study of human phenomena, particularly when the focus is on human beings as the primary subject of inquiry.

Foucault's critique of the humanities reveals the limitations of applying the methodologies and principles of natural sciences to human phenomena. His analysis suggests that the study of human behavior requires distinct approaches that account for its complexity, subjectivity, and moral dimensions.

4.The problem of the curriculum and the nature of the human phenomenon:

Given that the humanities are the last sciences to be separated from philosophy in the nineteenth century, this subject was subject to study and analysis epistemologically, and one of the most classic and contemporary problems facing us is the problem of its science. If empirical verification is a condition in the physical sciences, it is different for the humanities curricula, and this is what Descartes warned about, because we will be faced with many questions. Can we predict the occurrence of the human phenomenon?, is the principle of determinism applied to it? Can accuracy and objectivity be

investigated? Here we do not talk about procedural steps as much as we are interested in practicing it in the field, in addition to the failure of human phenomena to get rid of metaphysical reflection "Studies dealing with society have not reached the level of positivist sciences because research of this type has always been a prisoner of metaphysical thinking" (Muhammad Abed Al-Jabri, D.T., p.25).

As a result of these problems, Max Weber (1864-1920) believes that every human science currently works through interpretation, and the strength of this interpretation lies in the way we understand the meaning of an activity or phenomenon and the meaning of the various elements in relation to each other (Ibrahim Abrash, 2009, p.33).

Based on this, two trends emerged, the first represented in positivism led by the founder of French sociology, Auguste Comte and Emile Durkheim, where they tried to apply the scientific method to human and social phenomena by relying on the method of interpretation and prediction. The second objected to the possibility of applying the approach of interpretation to the human phenomenon, and proposed another approach that suits its specificity, which is the approach of understanding and interpretation. We will try to present the opinion of the two trends separately:

4.1. Positivism

Positivists believe that it is possible to study the human phenomenon in a scientific way, just as it is possible to study the physical phenomenon, as we can conduct experiments on it as we can predict its occurrence in the future, which is the position represented by some scientists such as Auguste Comte (1798-1957) Comte Auguste and Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) Émile Durkheim and others. Durkheim says: "To this day, sociologists have not paid much attention to identifying and defining the method they use to define social phenomena. Thus, we find that the problem of the method does not occupy a place in everything that Spencer produced, because he did not devote his book called (Introduction to Sociology) - that book whose title may have deceived us - to explaining the methods that should be used in sociology, but he limited himself to explaining the difficulties facing the emergence of this science, and the reasons that facilitate its entry into existence" (Emile Durkheim, 1950, p.48), Spencer (1820-1903) has made the law of evolution a principle to explain various sciences, including humanity. Accordingly, the positivists wanted to study the social phenomenon scientifically, in which laws can be formulated in the same way as studying the physical phenomenon, as things or what is called social physics, by defining their characteristics, which are:

*They exist outside the feeling of individuals, that is, they are bound by customs and traditions.

*Force majeure, which makes the social phenomenon characterized by coercion and compulsion, Durkheim says in his book (*The Rules of the Method in Sociology*): "It exists outside the feeling of individuals (...) Rather, it is characterized by a force majeure" (Durkheim, 1950, p.32).

*It is characterized as a collective (collective conscience), that is, general and common to all members of the same society and attributed to all of them.

*The social phenomenon does not work alone, so the goodness of society, for example, is the goodness of the family.

*It is a historical incident as it expresses a moment of history.

Thus, we can study the phenomenon scientifically and what proves that what is witnessing today is the social phenomenon of development, such as relying on the statistical method of calculations and graphs, and taking samples from societies. In addition, the law of suicide for Durkheim, which is due to social conditions and factors as well as psychological conditions. "There are two types of antisocial causes that can be attributed to them in principle, which have an impact on the rate of suicides, namely the organic conditions - psychological, and the nature of the physical environment - it may happen that within the individual structure, or at least, within the structure of a large group of individuals, a tendency of varying severity according to countries leads a person directly to suicide. On the other hand, climate and temperature may have...etc." (Durkheim, 2011, p.25).

5.The Problem of the Curriculum and the Nature of the Human Phenomenon

Since the humanities were the last sciences to separate from philosophy in the nineteenth century, they have been subject to extensive epistemological study and analysis. One of the most enduring issues is the question of their scientific status. While empirical verification is a key condition in the physical sciences, the approach to the humanities curriculum is quite different. This concern was highlighted by René Descartes, who warned about the complexities of studying human phenomena. Several important questions arise: Can we predict human phenomena? Does the principle of determinism apply to them? Can we achieve accuracy and objectivity? Here, the focus is not just on procedural steps but on how we apply them practically. Furthermore, human phenomena often fail to escape metaphysical reflection. As Muhammad Abed Al-Jabri observes, "Studies dealing with society have not reached the level of positivist sciences because research of this type has always been a prisoner of metaphysical thinking" (Muhammad Abed Al-Jabri, D.T., p.25).

Due to these challenges, Max Weber (1864-1920) argued that human sciences currently rely on interpretation. The strength of this interpretation lies

in understanding the meaning of activities or phenomena and how the various elements relate to one another (Ibrahim Abrash, 2009, p.33).

As a result, two main trends emerged within the human sciences. The first is **positivism**, led by figures like Auguste Comte (1798-1857) and Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), who tried to apply the scientific method to human and social phenomena. They believed that human phenomena could be studied using the same methods as physical phenomena, including interpretation and prediction. The second trend rejected the possibility of applying this approach to human phenomena and instead proposed an approach centered on understanding and interpretation. We will present both perspectives in turn:

5.1. Positivism

Positivists argue that the study of human phenomena can be conducted in a scientific manner, similar to the study of physical phenomena. They believed that experiments could be conducted on social and human behaviors, and that their occurrence could be predicted. This view was notably advocated by Auguste Comte and Émile Durkheim. Durkheim emphasized the importance of method in sociology, noting that "to this day, sociologists have not paid much attention to identifying and defining the method they use to define social phenomena" (Durkheim, 1950, p.48). He critiqued sociologist Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) for not dedicating his work, *Introduction to Sociology*, to explaining the methods used in sociology, limiting himself instead to discussing the difficulties faced by the emerging science.

Durkheim and Comte believed that social phenomena could be studied scientifically by formulating laws in much the same way as the physical sciences. They sought to define the characteristics of social phenomena, which include:

- **External existence:** Social phenomena exist outside the consciousness of individuals and are bound by customs, traditions, and societal norms.
- **Coercion:** Social phenomena exert a form of compulsion, as individuals are subject to societal forces beyond their control. Durkheim states: "It exists outside the feeling of individuals... rather, it is characterized by a force majeure" (Durkheim, 1950, p.32).
- **Collective consciousness:** Social phenomena are collective, meaning they are shared by all members of society and attributed to them collectively.
- **Interdependence:** Social phenomena do not function in isolation. For example, the goodness of society is connected to the goodness of the family.
- **Historical context:** Social phenomena are historical events, expressing a specific moment in history.

According to this view, we can scientifically study social phenomena, just as we study physical phenomena. Durkheim's **law of suicide**, for example, was influenced by social conditions and psychological factors. He proposed that there are two types of antisocial causes that impact the suicide rate: organic (psychological) and environmental (physical conditions). He explains: "There are two types of antisocial causes that can be attributed to them in principle, which have an impact on the rate of suicides, namely the organic conditions - psychological, and the nature of the physical environment" (Durkheim, 2011, p.25). Durkheim believed that factors like climate or individual psychological traits could explain the varying suicide rates observed across different societies.

Positivism in the humanities thus attempts to treat human and social phenomena as if they were akin to physical phenomena, where they can be measured, predicted, and explained using scientific methods such as statistics, observation, and experimentation. The positivists' reliance on these methods has led to significant developments in the study of human behavior, but it also faces criticisms related to the complexities and subjectivity inherent in human phenomena.

Durkheim believed that the major flaw of previous social scientists was their failure to establish a solid scientific methodology for studying human and social phenomena. Even though earlier attempts were made, they did not rise to a scientific standard and were not distinct from metaphysical philosophical views. In order to advance the humanities and social sciences, scholars started focusing more on methodological aspects. The first efforts to apply the experimental method from physical sciences to social and human studies are considered a step in this direction (Muhammad bin Sabaa, 2020, p.558).

5.1.1.Comment

It is important to note that the resemblance between social phenomena and natural phenomena has been overstated. While there are similarities, the distinction between the two is quite evident, as previously discussed. Lucian Goldman criticized the Durkheimian view, which posits that sociology should study facts in the same way as natural phenomena. Goldman argued that this approach is flawed because human study inherently involves consciousness, and any attempt to treat human phenomena like natural phenomena is bound to lead to misleading results. The subjectivity of the researcher, according to Goldman, inevitably influences the study of human beings (Lucian Goldman, 1996, p.5).

Regarding the psychological incident, Jean Piaget (1896-1980) viewed the development of the humanities as an inevitable outcome of their separation from philosophy. He also sought to resolve several issues related to the curricula that emerged from the nature of human topics and their specific

phenomena. Even though sociology initially borrowed from the natural sciences, psychology- being the last science to separate from philosophy- developed its own approaches and schools of thought focused on studying human behavior. Many of these schools argued that objectivity is not exclusive to the experimental sciences.

The first significant initiative in psychology came from the behaviorist school, spearheaded by American psychologist John B. Watson (1878-1958). Watson built on the work of Russian scientist Ivan Pavlov (1849-1936), focusing on how behavior is a response to stimuli and how it can be predicted and controlled. Later, the psychoanalytic school, led by Austrian Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), emerged. Freud's work was initially accepted and expanded by figures like Jean-Martin Charcot, Bernheim, and Brewer, who applied hypnosis in treating patients with hysteria. However, over time, this method was abandoned in favor of Freud's psychoanalysis.

This shift in psychology was further discussed by methodological logician Braithwaite, who noted: "Recent advances in physics may give a strong charge to psychologists to make bold reflections, because the prevailing physical theories revolve around things that cannot be defined within the limits of experience... Therefore, I feel that psychologists should be given great freedom to work, with regard to the entities they use, and I think that their field has been greatly hampered in the past by the demands of philosophers and others (I mean positivists and behaviorists)" (Yemenia Tarif Al-Khouli, 2012, p.121). This quote highlights the tension between the scientific demands of positivism and behaviorism, and the need for psychological research to explore the complexities of human experience beyond rigid experimental boundaries.

5.2.The Second Trend: The Humanities as Sciences of Understanding and Interpretation

In the nineteenth century, theorists began to recognize that the humanities are fundamentally sciences of understanding and interpretation, while the natural sciences focus more on prediction and empirical verification. Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) was one of the key thinkers in this shift. He argued that *hermeneutics*, the art of interpretation, is a universal method for all human sciences. For Dilthey, understanding human experiences was not just an additional aspect of human science but its very foundation.

Dilthey sought to establish hermeneutics as a comprehensive methodology for the humanities, focusing on how we understand human actions, history, and culture. He suggested that, unlike the natural sciences, which focus on external phenomena, the human sciences engage with the inner world of human meaning and experience. Hermeneutics, in Dilthey's framework, was not simply about interpreting texts but understanding the life-world of individuals

and societies through their actions, thoughts, and expressions (Safdar Ilahi Rad, 2019, pp.18-19).

This perspective builds on earlier philosophical traditions, particularly those of Immanuel Kant, who in his *Critique of Pure Reason* had tried to differentiate between the natural sciences (which study objects and phenomena that can be quantified) and human studies (which involve understanding the subjective intentions and meanings behind human actions). Dilthey agreed with Kant's distinction but expanded it, emphasizing that the humanities cannot be understood in the same way as the natural sciences because they deal with human consciousness, meaning, and interpretation (Asadov, 2025).

Dilthey further elaborated that the subject matter of the natural sciences involves things of the world, whereas the subject of the human sciences involves *other people*- their actions, their histories, their cultures, and the meanings they create. The method of study, therefore, must be different. For Dilthey, historical understanding, for instance, is not about quantifying events or predicting outcomes; it's about interpreting the meanings behind actions and events as experienced by individuals or groups in a specific context.

In his essay *Explanation and Understanding*, Dilthey emphasized that understanding human behavior and historical events involves a "personal knowledge" of what other human beings intend, experience, or feel. This contrasts with the objective and often impersonal method of the natural sciences. In this light, *hermeneutics* becomes more than a method; it becomes the foundation of the human and cultural sciences (Najafov, 2025).

Dilthey's work can also be seen as an extension of earlier efforts by philosophers such as Friedrich Schleiermacher, who argued for the importance of understanding and interpretation in the study of human action. Schleiermacher had previously suggested that philosophy should free itself from metaphysical interpretations and instead adopt a more practical approach to understanding human life. This call for a hermeneutic method was foundational for the later development of the human sciences.

Thus, Dilthey's emphasis on interpretation and understanding as the core of the humanities reflected a deepening of the distinction between the natural and human sciences. While the natural sciences could rely on empirical methods and prediction, the human sciences- by their nature- required an interpretive approach to grasp the meanings and intentions behind human phenomena.

Therefore, this trend is known as historical doctrine, which emerged within the framework of historical sciences in Germany during the second half of the nineteenth century, particularly through the work of Dilthey. The name of this doctrine highlights its focus on the study of history and its emphasis on mental and spiritual development. As a result, history becomes the central point of philosophical inquiry. Followers of this historical school argue that the essence

of history cannot be fully understood through the methods of natural sciences or any purely rational approach. They believe that history encompasses thought and integrates it into its various aspects over time (Boshinsky, 1992, p.168). The critique of the historical mind, rather than focusing solely on the pure mind or understanding of humanity, addresses the challenge of regaining awareness of one's historical context. Deltaï states, "It is not through introspection, but through history alone that we come to understand ourselves" (Adel Mustafa, 2018, p.68).

Heidegger suggests that Hermeneutics is an analysis of the phenomenon of understanding inherent in human existence. He refers to this process as "Dasein." Gadamer, following Heidegger's ideas, sees Hermeneutics as an ontological theory of understanding, asserting that understanding itself is rooted in language (Safader, 2019, p.20).

Dasein, or Heidegger's foundational concept of ontology (1889-1976), translates to "being-here." While it has various meanings, one key interpretation is that being Dasein means being able to be oneself. Thus, human or spiritual sciences focus on the self, and understanding and interpretation become central methods for exploring this subject. This distinction makes it impossible to apply the same approach used in the natural sciences. Deltaï argues, "The human sciences have estimated that they have specialized in studying the effects of an object that has a permission, and its results are determined by certainty of determinism multiplied by 'freedom."

'He is the Creator, who exists outside of His reality and essence. It is the being that inserts 'consciousness' into the fabric of the world" [Adel Mustafa, 1999, p.65].

Therefore, philosophers have been able to develop a curriculum tailored to the spiritual humanities, preserving the uniqueness of their subject matter without needing to borrow the methodologies of the natural sciences.

6.Conclusion

In conclusion, it is important to emphasize that philosophical topics, as well as the humanities and social sciences, require a variety of approaches. As such, it is essential to develop a curriculum that philosophers can follow when studying these diverse phenomena, such as historical events and social and psychological issues. The problem does not lie solely in the subject matter, but also in the curriculum itself. This highlights the need to rethink and update existing concepts in order to create a more integrated approach, avoiding unnecessary separation. Such integration would benefit human thought as a whole. Philosophy and science should be unified, with neither dominating the other, as this could hinder the advancement of human knowledge. The latter has already proven its ability to follow the path of other sciences and secure its place, despite the skepticism of many scientists. Therefore, the question arises:

Can the humanities align with the natural sciences, or should they establish their own unique curriculum that ensures compatibility with the nature and specific challenges of their topics and issues?.

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